Pittsburgh University School of Law

Scholarship@PITT LAW
Articles

Faculty Publications

2019

The Puzzle of the Constitutional Home
Gerald S. Dickinson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_articles

Recommended Citation
Gerald S. Dickinson, The Puzzle of the Constitutional Home, 80 Ohio State Law Journal 1099 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_articles/77

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship@PITT LAW. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@PITT LAW. For more
information, please contact leers@pitt.edu, shephard@pitt.edu.

The Puzzle of the Constitutional Home
GERALD S. DICKINSON*
The home enjoys a special place in American constitutional law. A
doctrinalthread runs across the firstfive amendments that demarcates
the home as a realm in which rights enjoy elevated protection. That
thread covers rights involving smut, guns, soldiers, searches, and selfincrimination, but inexplicably does not extend to takings. This stark
dichotomy between the solicitude of the home for most rights and the
oppositefor takings produces a deep puzzle.
This Article contends that the answer to thisfundamentalpuzzle is that
the Court's takings doctrine, unlike the home-centric doctrines in the
Bill of Rights, is infected with post-Lochner v. New York judicial
deference to economic regulation. This has influenced the Court's
aversion to a special protections doctrine to homes under the Takings
Clause. This Article argues that, as a matter of constitutionalcoherence
theory, which prizes doctrinal symmetry and harmony, the Court
should, in limited circumstances, extend the home-centric thread to
protecthomes in takings thatexpropriate title to or impact the economic
value of homes.
This Article also grapples with several broader methodological,
doctrinal, and theoretical implications. First, the Court consistently
applies atextual methods of interpretation of the home. Second, this
atextual interpretive pattern of influence supports this Article's
proposition that the home-centric doctrinal thread should extend to
takings. Finally, a congruent home-centric Bill ofRights that extends to
takings aligns neatly with constitutionalcoherence theory.
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C O N CLU SIO N .............................................................................. 1 14 8
I. INTRODUCTION

The home occupies a special place within the Constitution. 1 Americans'
admiration "for the sanctity of the home" is linked to the individual, the family,
and the fabric of society. 2 The home is the "moral nexus between liberty,
privacy, and freedom of association" and property. 3 This sentiment is the basis
of the Supreme Court's distinctive protections to the home. The Court has had
to grapple with the intersection of the meaning of the "home" and the nature of
individual rights across a range of constitutional provisions. This engagement
has produced a stark dichotomy and a deep puzzle. In most contexts, the Court
finds reason to grant special solicitude to a zone of constitutional protection
emanating from the distinctive nature of the home. The Court has, in other
words, extended itself to textually adhere or doctrinally shape its jurisprudence
to protect the home, as opposed to other places and spaces. That solicitude is
entirely absent when it comes to the Takings Clause.
To appreciate this dichotomy, take for example the Court's relatively recent
cases where the home was at the center of the Court's review. In Kelo v. City of
New London, Justice Stevens upheld the seizure of homes for economic
development purposes as justifiable under the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause. 4 Yet, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the late Justice Antonin Scalia
1

See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 978,

996-1002
(1982).
2

1d at 1013.
991.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 90 (2005).

3
Id. at
4
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elevated the right to bear arms in the "hearth and home" above all other interests
under the Second Amendment. 5 This is odd. The Second Amendment does not
6
textually say that the right to bear arms enjoys greater protection in the home.
Likewise, the Fifth Amendment does not textually preclude or grant special
compensation formulas or heightened scrutiny when homes are subject to
physical or regulatory takings] To make his atextual leap in the Second
Amendment, Justice Scalia, who purported to ascribe to "public meaning"
originalism, leaned on the Fourth Amendment's explicit homebound protections
arising from Payton v. New York.8 There, the Court explained that "the physical
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed." 8 Justice Scalia then extended such protections in Kyllo
v. UnitedStates.9 However, in Kelo v. City ofNew London, Justice Stevens-to

the dismay of Justice Thomas in his dissent-was uninterested in equating the
Fourth Amendment's search and seizure protections in the home with the idea
that such protections similarly extend to physically taking homes. 10 Yet, the
home-centric doctrinal acrobatics employed by Justice Scalia have also been
exercised in other areas of constitutional interpretation throughout the Bill of
Rights.
For example, the Court had no trouble lifting the sanctity of the home in
Stanley v. Georgia, extolling that "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it
means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch." 1 1 The Court later
expanded its focus from freedom of mind and thought in the home 12 to
protections to "privacy and freedom of association in the home."113 Notice again
that nothing in the First Amendment remotely offers special protections to or
within homes. 15 There are, however, examples of textual clarity, if not, purity,
of the home in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, the Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
5U.S. CONST.amend. II.

amend. V.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 (Justice Scalia embracing an interpretation of the
Constitution that is "guided by the principle that '[t]he Constitution was written to be
understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as
6 U.S.CONST.
7

distinguished from technical meaning."' (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716,
731 (1931)).
8
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (citing United States v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
9
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). He noted that "in the case of the
search of the interior of homes-the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area
of protected privacy-there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the
minimal expectation of privacy that exists." Id.
10
See infra Part IV.A.
u
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (emphasis added).
12
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973).
13
Moreno v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 413
U.S. 528
(1973).
14
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Co. v. Sawyer gave credence to the Third Amendment's textual prohibition of
quartering soldiers in a home during peacetime, noting that "even in war time,
[the Third Amendment requires that] seizure of needed military housing must
be authorized by Congress. 15 And in Boydv. UnitedStates, the Court explained
that its Fourth Amendment search and seizure and Fifth Amendment criminal
procedure protections almost run directly into each other, thus giving the home
a special place of protection from self-incrimination. 16 Takings Clause
jurisprudence, however, is devoid of special protections to homes and is equally
wanting of any special protections in the home.
The Takings Clause, generally, protects homes from takings that do not
satisfy the public use requirement or that fail to pay just compensation. 18 There
is nothing special about those well-established limitations; they apply equally
to most forms of private property. It is not as if Justice Stevens in, say, Kelo was
doctrinally or textually handicapped from doing in takings what Justice Scalia
did with guns in Heller or Justice Marshall did with smut in Stanley-that is,
formulate a methodological and theoretical interpretation of the home to
conclude that a special zone of protection existed. Yet, the Court has simply
refused to do so in takings. Why is this?
Justice Thomas's dissent in Kelo offers perhaps the ultimate clue to solving
this mystery. His dissent employs an intradoctrinal maneuver by juxtaposing the
Fourth Amendment and the Takings Clause. There, he was alarmed at the
majority's refusal to protect the home, noting that the Court has "elsewhere [in
the Fourth Amendment] recognized 'the overriding respect for the sanctity of
the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the
Republic,"' and that "[t]hough citizens are safe from the government in their
homes, the homes themselves are not."18 Importantly, he then stated, "the
[majority] tells us that we are not to 'second-guess the [legislative's] considered
judgments"' but the real issue is "whether the government may take the
infinitely more intrusive step [than unlawfully searching a home] of tearing
down the petitioners' homes. ' 20 As a result, Justice Thomas argued, something
' 20
has "gone seriously awry with this Court's interpretation of the Constitution."
He continued, "[w]e would not defer to a legislature's determination of the
various circumstances that establish, for example, when a search of a home
would be reasonable," because we have recognized the "overriding respect for
the sanctity of the home. 2 1 Indeed, the uprooting of persons from their homes
is, to Justice Thomas, a "justification for intrusive judicial review" as set forth

15

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
16
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
17
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 518 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
19
Id

20 Id.
21

Id. (emphasis added).
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in United States v. Carolene Products.22 Several major methodological and
theoretical implications about the "constitutional home" emerge in those few
lines buried in Justice Thomas's dissent.
First, Justice Thomas's dissent implicitly answers why there exists
asymmetry of the home in the Bill of Rights. The Takings Clause is infected
with post-Lochner v.New York deference to economic legislation; the other
homebound amendments are not. The Court's home-centric jurisprudence
involving smut, guns, soldiers, searches, and self-incrimination-as opposed to
takings-simply has nothing to do with economic legislation, and thus are
immune to the Court's post-Lochner deferential treatment to social and
economic regulations. They are, in other words, primarily fundamental rights
issues that have shaped a doctrine amenable to protections of homes where
liberty and privacy concerns are most pronounced. While the Court's
development of an exactions doctrine provides heightened standards of review
in disputes over land use permitting, the level of scrutiny and the rulings, in and
of themselves, have not risen to the level of Lochner-eradismay for social and
23
economic legislation.
Second, Justice Thomas's dissent implicitly alludes to a longing for
adherence to coherence theory in constitutional interpretation. His argument is
that if the Fourth Amendment provides protections to homes (albeit within the
zone of privacy), then it would seem that, as a matter of consistency and
symmetry, the Court should likewise extend similar special protections to homes
threatened by condemnation for purposes of economic development under the
Fifth Amendment. Taken to its logical conclusion, if smut, guns, soldiers,
searches, and self-incrimination all enjoy some form of protection or liability
regarding the home, then takings should neatly provide a similar result as a
matter of uniformity. This Article proceeds in four Parts.
Part II revisits the Court's jurisprudence protecting the "home" across the
first five amendments. The exercise reveals an imbalance and lack of complete
coherence in constitutional interpretation: the Court has carved out home-centric
doctrines involving smut, guns, soldiers, searches, and self-incrimination, yet
the Court offers no equivalent express interest in or direct protection to the home
in its takings jurisprudence. 25 There is a tendency among property 25 and
22

521.
See Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its
Impact
on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REv. 605, 607 08 (1996); infra Part III.B.
24
See infra Part III. I recognize that home-centric protections extend beyond the Bill
of Rights, as the Court has found a right to consensual sodomy in the home. See Lawrence
v.Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 79 (2003). However, this Article focuses onthe peculiar schism
in the first five amendments where home protections are absent from the Takings Clause and
the Court's
takings jurisprudence.
25
Property scholars have not engaged in textual and doctrinal interpretive
methodologies to reorient the homebound amendments in the Bill of Rights. Margaret Radin
has analyzed her theory of "personhood" through the lens of the Court's decisions giving
privacy and liberty protections to the home under its First and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. See Radin, supra note 1, at 911 1002. In doing so, she identified the
23

1d. at

1104

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 80:6

constitutional 26 law scholars to make light of this stark dichotomy. Some go as
far as to ignore the schism by reiterating that the Takings Clause offers
protections to homes, yet do not acknowledge that the Court's takings doctrine
fails to provide special protections to homes, as opposed to other doctrines in
the Bill of Rights. This Part revisits this underexplored lacuna 27 within the
"anomalous" nature of the Court's takings jurisprudence lacking any similar protection to
the "home," contemplating a special class of property protections to a family home against
government takings. Id. at 1006. But Radin neither expressly connects all five amendments
utilizing interpretive methodologies nor explains why there exists this abrupt departure of
protections to the "home" under the Takings Clause. It is worth noting that the Court's
announcement that the Second Amendment also entails a liberty protection to bear arms in
the "home and hearth" arrived in 2008, nearly twenty-five years after Radin's
groundbreaking article. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008)
(holding that the Second Amendment protects individuals' rights to carry guns in the home).
Benjamin Barros, likewise, has covered the Court's First and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in a non-interpretive manner proselytizing the "home," yet when arriving at
the Takings Clause, Barros merely ponders that the Court's failure in its Kelo v. City of New
London decision to "address the unique nature of the home is striking" in light of the "litany
of areas in which homes are given special legal treatment." D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a
Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 255, 297 (2006). Barros, like others, fails to
provide any explanation for this "striking" fact or embark on the question of why the Court's
takings
jurisprudence lacks home-centric protections. See id.
26
Few scholars have recognized this constitutional puzzle, and only a handful have
explored the fundamental question of why this schism exists across the first five
amendments. See Akhil Reed Amar, America's Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734,
1776 (2011) [hereinafter Amar, America'sLived Constitution].Amar identifies the Takings
Clause as protecting private property, including homes, broadly, and that judges might be
"vigilant" in protecting the home by special just compensation calculations. Id. But Amar's
treatment of the home under each of the amendments is cursory, and he, like others, misses
an opportunity to resolve the puzzle by asking the bigger question of why the Court's takings
jurisprudence departs from its other homebound amendments. AKHiL REED AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCIiON 267 (1998). While Amar has noted that
protections to the home under the Constitution were largely a result of the post-

Reconstruction era where the Third Amendment bridged together a "home-centric Second
Amendment and a Fourth Amendment that was from the beginning protective of the private
domain," he merely explains that the prevailing dichotomy between "privacy" and
"property" may have something to do with distinctions in protections to homes. Id.
27
Constitutional law scholars have only partially pieced together the amendment puzzle
presented in this Article, and none are fixated on the Court's home-centric void under its
takings jurisprudence or attempted to offer explanations for the departure. Darrell Miller has
drawn parallels and contradictions between the Second and Fourth Amendments to argue
that the right to bear arms in the "home" and in public should be tempered by the First
Amendment's lack of protections to "smut" in public. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut:
Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1278, 1278 (2009)

(arguing for courts to "[t]reat the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for selfdefense the same as the right to own and view adult obscenity [in the home] under the First
Amendment," and making tacit reference to homebound conceptions across the first five
amendments). But Miller declines to extend his proposal, let alone analyze the other
"homebound" amendments, especially the Takings Clause, in his piece. Stephanie Stern

similarly argues for less emphasis on the "home" under Fourth Amendment search and
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"penumbra of home-related rights" to better appreciate the nature of this
2
constitutional puzzle. 8
Part III answers the question of why the Court's takings jurisprudence is
devoid of home protections by arguing that the Court's first five home-centric
doctrines in the Bill of Rights are immune to and shielded from the Court's
29
embrace of post-Lochner era judicial deference to economic regulation.
However, the Court's takings jurisprudence, unlike its homebound counterparts,
is focused on advancing a body of law that primarily falls in line with preserving
the post-Lochner judicial repudiation of substantive due process review of
economic legislation.
Part IV seeks to ground this Article's call for home-centric harmony across
the Bill of Rights in coherence theory. 30 If the Court's goal is to read the
document with an eye towards consistency and accord, then it has arguably
failed in the context of a person's property and privacy rights in the home given
the inexplicable absence of special home protections in the Takings Clause.
Otherwise, the most logical alternative interpretation would be for the Court to
employ a strictly textualist method of interpretation to achieve coherence by
extending special protections to the home in the Bill of Rights only where the
text commands in the Third and Fourth Amendments. But, of course, such an
alternative is a far more radical departure from longstanding home-centric
seizure jurisprudence, but like Miller, never gets around to tying the Court's other
amendment jurisprudence on the home together to offer a coherent understanding of what
makes protecting homes from takings different from protecting smut, guns, or soldiers. See
Stephanie M. Stem, The Inviolate Home: HousingExceptionalismin the FourthAmendment,

95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 905 (2010) (arguing to replace emphasis on the physical home
under Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence with narrower residential privacy
interests). While John Fee notes that "[f]ederal constitutional law recognizes the unique
status of the home in several ways" under the First, Third and Fourth Amendments. John
Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 786 (2006).
He leaves gaps in homebound interpretations in the Second Amendment and Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination clause and concludes that legislative action is required (as
opposed to Supreme Court doctrine) to absolutely bar taking homes. Id. at 788-89; see also
Ariama Kennedy Kelly, The Costs ofthe FourthAmendment: Home Searches and Takings

Law, 28 Miss. C. L. REV. 1, 4, 18 28 (2009) (arguing that "home searches" under the Fourth
Amendment "should be viewed as takings" under the Fifth Amendment). Thomas
Sprankling covers the Third and Fifth, but does not offer an assessment of the home across
the first four amendments in relation to the Takings Clause and does not, as this Article does,
explore why the Court's takings jurisprudence neglects to offer greater protections to homes.
See Thomas G. Sprankling, Does Five Equal Three? Reading the Takings Clause in Light of
the ThirdAmendment's ProtectionofHouses, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 112 (2012) (arguing

that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause should be read to protect homes from takings in
light of the Third Amendment's protection to the home); see also Michael A. Cottone, The
Textualist Third Amendment, 82 TENN. L. REV. 537, 540 41, 541 54 (2015) (engaging in
contextual
and intratextual approaches to the Third Amendment).
28
Ravinv. State, 537 P.2d 494, 500 (1975).
29
See Fee, supra note 27, at 788 89. Fee mentions that "in contrast to other areas of
the law,
eminent domain law" is highly deferential. Id.
30
See infra Part IV.
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jurisprudence. Instead, the Court seems content to employ a purposivist and
largely precedent-based methodological approach to home limitations in a
variety of contexts to achieve coherence. This history of atextualism's
predominance in the home raises the specter that, instead of traditional
explanations, such as the privacy versus property dichotomy, constitutional
coherence theory is the underlying influence for the Court's constitutional
interpretation. Thus, such a theory should influence the home-centric doctrinal
thread to extend to takings. As Richard Fallon explains: [I]f the conclusions fail
to cohere into a uniform prescription for how the case or issue ought to be
resolved, then any or all of the individual conclusions may be reexamined, and
the results adjusted ... in an effort to achieve a uniform outcome.31 What Fallon
and other adherents of coherence theory mean is that the Court, in striving for
consistency, ought to adjust the traditional interpretive tools of structure, text,
doctrine, and history in a manner that achieves a uniform, coherent outcome.
Thus, where incoherence and inconsistency exist, the Court should adjust
some of the tools, such as textualism and doctrinalism, to arrive at the most
coherent conclusion. As a result, if faced with a takings challenge where
plaintiffs are homeowners who request the Court seek harmony with the rest of
its home-centric Bill of Rights doctrines to specially protect the home, the Court
should engage, for example, in some formulation of atextualism and
intradoctrinalism, to achieve a coherent, uniform outcome. The Court's
prevailing takings doctrine fails to conclude that homes deserve greater
protections above all other property interests. Thus, it should, in limited
circumstances, find for special compensation formulas, per se and categorical
tests, or basic heightened standards of review where homes are subject to taking.
What we are concerned with, then, as readers and interpreters of the Constitution
as law, is the ability to read into the document "consistency rather than
inconsistency." 32 Indeed, the dual methodologies of textualism and doctrinalism
fit like a glove into coherence theory, because both methods espouse a "certain
undeniable aesthetic attraction, appealing to ideals of symmetry and
33
harmony."
31

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation,
100 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1240 (1987) (emphasis added).
32
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 794 (1999).
33
1d. at 799. Note that textualism is often referred to as "structural" or "historical"
interpretations of the canon. Scholars continue to debate the semantics. For example, Phil
Bobbitt set forth six modalities (or methods) of interpretation, which include historical,
textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical. See PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3 119 (1982). Akhil Amar argues that "structural" and
"historical" interpretations are "documentarian" as they seek to pull meaning from the
document itself. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114
HARV. L. REV. 26, 30 (2000). He also refers to the method of interpreting the Constitution to
identify pattern recognition by juxtaposing adjoining and nonadjoining amendments,
clauses, and provisions within and across the document as "intratextualism." See generally
id. For purposes of this Article, specifically Part II, I am implicitly engaging in both textual
and doctrinal methods of interpretation across the first five amendments, with a special
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However, it is the atextual or doctrinal interpretive pattern of influence
grounded in coherence theory that supports this Article's proposition that the
doctrinal thread should extend to takings to achieve coherence by altering its
prevailing takings doctrine to impose special protections on homes, if not
homeowners. A home-centric Takings Clause would, indeed, bring a variety of
constitutional phenomena involving the home into a coherent conception of
constitutional interpretation across the Bill of Rights. Few, if any, scholars have
engaged these methodological tools and theoretical explanations in the context
of the "constitutional home."

II. THE SUPREME COURT'S HOMEBOUND DOCTRINES REVISITED
William Blackstone has raised the home as a paramount legal concept under
American law. He noted that "every man's house is looked upon by the law to
be his castle." 34 Such sentiments have led to the castle doctrine under Supreme
Court precedent; that is, a person's home is his castle, and the common law
traditionally protected the house as a "castle of defence and asylum." 35 Notable
constitutional law scholars, such as John Fee and Akhil Amar, have noted
houses as being "singled out above and beyond all buildings" and "a special
place for privacy. '36 As a result, both federal constitutional law and statutory
law "recognize the home as a special place worth preserving." 37 In fact, it was
the Republican Party that influenced legislation during Reconstruction to
promote homeownership. 38 But, the home is not just a special place.
The locus offers something "uniquely personal," thus "making it different
and in a sense of higher value than other forms of real property. '40 As Jeanie
Suk has explained, the "[h]ome has been central to the articulation of
constitutional rights, including the right against unreasonable search and
seizure, the right to due process, the right of privacy, and (recently) the right to
bear arms," which "lies at the center of the legal edifice that helps to construct
human experience. ' 40 Likewise, the home is "treated more favorably ' 41 than
other types of property, largely because the home is "inextricably part of' our

emphasis on doctrinalism as the core interpretive method that justifies extending the
homebound doctrinal thread to the Takings Clause as a matter of coherence theory.
34 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *288.
35

Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931
(1995) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *288).
36
Amar, America'sLived Constitution, supra note 26, at 1772.
37
Fee, supra note 27, at 786 87.
3 8
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863 1877, at
68 (1988).
39
Fee, supra note 27, at 793.
40

JEANIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW 3, 133 (2009).
41 See Barros, supra note 25, at 255.
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society. 42 Indeed, "with very few exceptions-notably that of the home-the
43
Framers' conception of liberty related primarily to persons rather than places.1
But, in some circumstances, the "right to possess a home is given more
protection than the right to possess other types of property," such as
"[h]omestead exemptions, rights of redemption in foreclosure, just-cause
eviction statutes, and residential rent control."144 Some argue that the Framers
"envisioned a private, parochial, and rather sedentary people" 45 and that the
home was "singled out for special constitutional treatment" because it was
deemed a "consecrated constitutional location" immune from intrusion. 46 Even
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has described the home as a
"sanctuary." 47 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court found a protected liberty and
dignity interest to engage in private consensual sexual activity between
48
consenting adults, especially in the home.
Indeed, jurists join legal scholars in exalting over the home. A few state
supreme courts have concluded that the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendment's self-incrimination protections created a "zone of privacy"
regarding security to and in the home. 4 9 The Ninth Circuit recognized in United
States v. Craigheadthat the "home occupies a special place in the pantheon of
constitutional rights," including privacy and self-defense-related protections to
the "home" under the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Amendments, 50 adding
that the Fifth Amendment's protections to custodial interrogations extended to
a suspect's own home. 52 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has constructed a
Constitution that "manifests a special concern with the protection of the
home" 52-except, of course, within its takings jurisprudence. This is a striking,
42

Radin, supra note 1, at 1013.

43 Timothy Zick, ConstitutionalDisplacement,86 WASH. U. L. REv. 515, 595 (2009).
44

See Barros, supra note 25, at 276.

45 Zick, supra note 43, at 539.
46

47

1Id.

Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 82 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part)
(recognizing
that tenants have a "fundamental interest" in their housing).
48
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
49
See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 498 502 (1975). This was stated before the
Court's 2008 ruling in Heller, which lifted the "hearth and home" as a special place to bear
arms. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
50 In United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1077 (2008), the court stated:
Under the First Amendment, the "State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in
his house, what books he may read or what films he may watch." The Second
Amendment prohibits a federal "ban on handgun possession in the home." The Third
Amendment forbids quartering soldiers "in any house" in time of peace "without the
consent of the Owner." The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable
searches and seizures in our 'persons, houses, papers, and effects."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
51Id.
52

See Michael C. Doff, Does Heller Protecta Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?,
59 SYRACUSE L. REv. 225, 232 (2008); see also Miller, supra note 27, at 1305 (arguing that
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yet strange, dichotomy that I will explore in just a moment. But first, let us
explore the Court's home-centric doctrines involving smut.
A. Smut
We begin by exploring the Court's handling of cases involving protections
to the home under its First Amendment jurisprudence with an eye towards
doctrinal interpretations, because the text of the First Amendment does not
expressly mention the home. 54 The First Amendment, instead, recognizes the
state's interest in regulating and protecting against obscenity, but at the same
time protects the right of a person to receive information and ideas, despite the
questionable social value or worth of the material. 54 This includes prohibiting,
to some extent, the state from regulating a person's private thoughts. 55 But what
about a person engaging (or indulging) in his desire to read and think about such
material in his home?
The Supreme Court in Stanley v. Georgia held that the First Amendment
protects a person's right to possess obscene material in the privacy of his home,
even though the Court conceded that the state had the power to regulate
obscenity in the public sphere. 56 In Stanley, police executed a search warrant to
enter Robert Eli Stanley's home, where they found adult film. 57 Stanley was
later arrested after the police determined the film was in violation of a Georgia
59
statute.

Justice Marshall's majority opinion
constitutional take on the "home." There, he
a person has a "right to satisfy his intellectual
of his own home" and that state regulation

offers clues into the Court's
reiterated the Court's position that
and emotional needs in the privacy
cannot "reach into the privacy of

one's own home. '59 Perhaps most worthy of attention is this: "If the First
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch. "60
The Court's ruling in Stanley steadfastly adhered to the "home" as a castle
under the First Amendment, reiterating the heightened protection that the
Constitution gives to such activity in the home. The Court followed up its
Stanley decision in United States v. Williams, where it dealt with Secret Service
agents who "obtained a search warrant for William's home" and found hard
guns outside the home should be treated the same way as obscene materials are treated under
the First
Amendment).
5 3
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
54
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563 64 (1969).
55
1d. at 565 66.
56
1d.at 568.
57
1d. at 558.
58
1d.
59

60

1d. at 565.

Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added).
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drives that contained "images of real children engaged in sexually explicit
conduct.16 1 The Court affirmed Stanley, but explained that lewd material and
62
obscenity of underage children were not protected under the First Amendment.
Its decision in Osborne v. Ohio likewise found the Stanley ruling "firmly
63
grounded in the First Amendment."
However, it is important to note here that while one may view and enjoy
such material in the home, a person is not protected, as the Court has stated in
United States v. Orito, from distributing such material, even if from within the
home. 64 The Supreme Court then, in ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton, refused to
extend the protections of lewd material for noncommercial purposes, or in other
words refused to interpret a "theater" as an equivalent to a home. 6 5 Further, the
Court has extended free speech protections to residential areas, paying heed to
the home as a safe space for speech that cannot be infringed upon. 66 However,
the right to privacy must yield if particular activities in the home interfere with
the public welfare.67 I will return to this particular limitation in Part III.
Let us now turn to the Second Amendment, where protections to the "home"
were most recently etched into the Court's jurisprudence.
B. Guns
In Districtof Columbia v. Heller,the Court held that a total ban on handguns

in the "home" was tantamount to a complete ban on an entire class of arms, and
that the state must permit a person to register and issue a license for the person
to carry a gun in his home. 68 The D.C. ordinance specifically required that a
"lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock at all
times, rendering it inoperable." 69 In striking down the ordinance, the Court
showed its concern regarding any prohibition of firearms that extended to the
home, because the "need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute"
in the home and that handguns are regularly used to protect one's home.7° The
Court's focus on the home was not by accident. Senator Samuel Pomeroy,
during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, stated that "Every
man... should have the right to bear arms for the defense of himself and family
61
United
62

States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 291 92 (2008).
Id.at 288 89.
63 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108 n.3 (1990) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 64
195 (1986)).
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141 42 (1973).
65
Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-68 (1973).
66
Frisby v.Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988); Carey v.Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471
(1980); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970); Gregory v. City of
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 26 (1969); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 87 (1949);
Martinv. City of Struthers, 318 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
67
Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 280 (1982).
68 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008).
69
1Id. at 628.
70
Id.
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and his homestead." 71Justice Scalia's opinion ventured to the Revolutionary
Era to unpack the significance of arms in the home, noting that "[i]n the colonial
and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen and
72
weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same.
But, Justice Scalia's opinion also offered an extensive explanation for why
the locus of the firearm-the home-as opposed to other spaces or places not
readily perceived as private is essential to Second Amendment protections.
There, he stated that citizens prefer handgun possession in the home as a form
of defense because such guns are "easier to store" and are "accessible" in the
event of an emergency, such as when an intruder enters the home to try to
wrestle away the gun.73 Justice Scalia, concerned with intruders like burglars,
saw great value in being able to "lift and aim" a handgun in the home while
dialing the police with the other free hand versus a long gun that required
pointing the gun at the attacker.7 4 Besides the multitasking function that a small
handgun apparently gives to gun owners when attacked in the home, Justice
Scalia may be telling us more about the "home" than is apparent from a surface
reading ofHeller. He then departs from textualism and instead creatively inserts
his own version of what the Constitution means by stating that "whatever else
[the Second Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above
all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in
75
defense of hearth and home."
But, as Justice Stevens explained the Framers' intent, the idea that
militiamen could "keep" firearms really meant that they could "store" such arms
in their homes to be used in service when called upon, and that "[d]ifferent
language surely would have been used to protect nonmilitary use and
possession" of arms in the home had that been the intent of the Framers. 76 As
Justice Stevens argued, this simply did not include bearing the arms to protect
the hearth and home. And, as Justice Breyer questioned, "[w]hat is [the] basis
77
for finding [hearth and home] to be the core of the Second Amendment right?"
Is it really the case, largely supported by limited sources, such as a state court
decision, that the Second Amendment protects, primarily, persons bearing an
78
arm beside his or her bedside?

71

72

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1182 (1866).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 624 25 (quoting State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 98 (1980)

(alteration
in original)).
73
Id. at 629.
74 I.
75
Id. at 635.
76

77

78

M. at 650 51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 720 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alterations added).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 720 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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C. Soldiers
The Third Amendment states that "[n]o Soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner." 79 There was very
81
little debate over the inclusion of an anti-quartering clause in the Constitution.
Most states strongly supported such a provision.8 2 While the Court has not
directly reviewed a challenge grounded in the Third Amendment, its case law
has offered useful summaries of the oft-neglected provision. The Amendment
has been interpreted as a "property-based privacy interest" that protects "a
fundamental right to privacy. '8 3 It has not been limited to mere fee simple
ownership, but rather to any "lawful occupation or possession with a legal right
83
to exclude others."
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court clarified property-based privacy
protections under the Constitution.8 5 The Court reasoned that privacy, in and of
itself, is based largely on a desire to be secure in their homes, such as having
privacy in a marital relationship.8 5 Thus, "one who owns or lawfully possesses
or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of
privacy."8 6 As a result of the Third Amendment and other constitutional
provisions extending special protections to the home, the Court found a general
penumbra of privacy in the home.87 Some have interpreted the amendment to
solely embody a "fundamental value" of the "sanctity of the home" and that
textually stretching the provision to include nonresidential and non-fee simple
ownership or occupation is inappropriate.88 A literal, textual reading of the
amendment only plausibly protects "fee simple owners of houses." 89 Likewise,
the Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer gave credence to the Third

Amendment's prohibition of quartering soldiers in a home during peace time,
noting that the "Third Amendment [mandates] ... in war time [any] seizure of
90
needed military housing.., be authorized by Congress."
79

U.S. CONST. amend. III.
80 Sprankling, supra note 27, at 128.
81
See id.
82
Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962 (2nd Cir. 1982).
83
Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 44 n.12 (1978)).
84
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
85 See id. at 485 86 (discussing the expansive nature of privacy interests as they relate
to marital
relations).
86
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 44 n. 12.
87
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (stating that the Fourth and Fifth Amendment

protections against govenment invasions of privacy extend to the "sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life").
8 8Engblom, 677 F.2d at 967 68 (Kaufman, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that, while "the home is a privileged place," this protection does not encompass the
occupational residences of correctional officers in the scope of their employment).
89
d. at 968.
90
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952) (Jackson, J.,

concurring).
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D. Searches
The Court's ruling in Payton v. New York is its longstanding pinnacle case
drawing a fine line between searches and seizures in public spaces and those
conducted in a person's home. 91 There, Justice Stevens' opinion commingled
search and seizure with the concept of the home, finding that while warrantless
arrests in public may be constitutional, such arrests in the home are
unconstitutional. 92 The Court explained, "the physical entry of the home is the
93
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.
The Court went so far as to say that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, in
and of itself, was to "guard against arbitrary governmental invasions of the
home," 94 and that there existed a distinction between searches and seizures in
the office as opposed to the home. 95 However, it is important to note here that
the dissent in Payton sought to rein in the home-centric emphasis of the
majority's opinion, noting that the "Fourth Amendment is concerned with
protecting people, not places, and no talismanic significance is given to the fact
that an arrest occurs in the home rather than elsewhere. "96 Still, the Court's
homebound approach to the Fourth Amendment influenced subsequent
decisions.
In Wilson v. Layne, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that a "media ride-along"
of reporters into a person's home while police conducted a search with a warrant
violated the Fourth Amendment. 98 There, a group of homeowners, suing federal
law enforcement officials under federal law, sought to protect the homebound
precedent of the Court's jurisprudence and extend such protections to not only
warrantless searches in the home, but to third-party media and reporters who
happen to enter the home during a lawful search. 99 Indeed, this "ride-along
intrusion" into a home runs afoul of the Court's conception of the sanctity of the
home. 99 Further, at the core ofthe Fourth Amendment is what the Court believes
to be the "right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion." 10 0 The Fourth Amendment provides for,
9 1Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
590 (1980) ("In terms that apply equally to
seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line
at the92entrance to the house.").
Id.
93
Id. at 585 (citation omitted).
94
Id. at 582 n.17.
95
96

Id. at 586 n.25.

at 615 (White, J., dissenting).
Wilsonv. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 605 (1999).
9 8 See id. at 608 (highlighting petitioners
who "contended that the officers' actions in
bringing members of the media to observe and record the attempted execution of the arrest
warrant violated their Fourth Amendment rights").
99
Id. at 613 ("Surely the possibility of good public relations for the police is simply not
enough, standing alone, to justify the ride-along intrusion into a private home.").
100 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citing Boyd v. United States,
1d.

97

116 U.S. 616, 626 30 (1886)).
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"The right of the people to be secure in their.. .houses ... against
unreasonable searches and seizures .... "102
However, the Supreme Court has also made clear that the protection is about
"people," not "places.1 10 2 Even so, the Court has also acknowledged that the
Fourth Amendment's protections depend upon the locus, or where the individual
is located at the time of the search, and whether he personally has an expectation
of privacy in the place searched. 103
The Court made an explicit distinction between protections in the home in
Rakas v. Illinois. There, the Court stated that there is a fine line regarding
reasonable expectations of privacy in the home, which is often dependent upon
whether the source of the reasonable expectation is "outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or
to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.1 10 4 Justice
Rehnquist, in his majority opinion in Minnesota v. Carter,further acknowledged
that the "text of the Amendment" meant only that persons "in 'their' houses"
were protected. 10 5 Yet, amidst the Court's precedential broadening of the
concept of the home as a protection, it also provided protections in "some
circumstances" to a person housed in the home in another, 10 6 such as an
overnight guest, because it is "social custom" that should, likewise, be
recognized as a daily expectation of privacy. 107 Justice Stevens has noted that
invasion of the home for search purposes without a warrant is "presumptively
unreasonable." 10 8 This, the Court has noted, is a "firm line at the entrance to the
house" that must not be crossed by police without a warrant. 109 Justice White,
animated by the threat of unchecked law enforcement invasions, explained that
the home's expectation of privacy "is plainly one that society is prepared to
recognize as justifiable." 110
Justice Scalia, the architect of the Second Amendment's protections to the
"hearth and home," explained in Kyllo v. United States that "in the case of the
search of the interior of homes-the prototypical and hence most commonly
litigated area of protected privacy-there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in
the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists" to withdraw
that protection with new technology "not in general public use" that would erode

101 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
102
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
10 3
Id. ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525
U.S.1083, 83 (1998).
4 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
105 Carter,525 U.S. at 89.
106 Id.
10

7 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990).

108Grohv.

Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004).
9Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (per curiam).
110 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
10
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that privacy.ill Justice Stevens explained that scanning technology that does not
physically penetrate the interior of the home is not the same as the physical
penetration of the home that many would agree is an example of the chief evil
112
against the Fourth Amendment.
It seems that the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on the "home"
does not turn on expectations of privacy as the Court has previously stated, but
rather on whether the property utilized for privacy is commercial or residential.
The Fourth Amendment arguably treats commercial property differently by
providing lesser protections to individuals than those owning or occupying a
home.11 3 Indeed, searches and seizures regarding "purely commercial"
transactions in the home of another, without any prior connection to the
homeowner-householder, will not violate the Fourth Amendment. 114 However,
at the core of the protections is the "psychological primacy of privacy in the
home" and the "political and historical role" that the home plays as a "haven"
from government overreach.1 1 5 Some argue that the Fourth Amendment was
meant to protect property.11 6 But the Court quickly disposed of property
theories, explaining in Warden v. Hayden that "[w]e have recognized that the
principal object of the [amendment] is the protection of privacy rather than
property, and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers
117
rested on property concepts."
And finally, in Katz v. United States, the Court solidified its position that
the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places." 118 Yet, the Court has
downplayed other forms of property in comparison to the "home" when
determining levels of protection.1 1 9 Justice Burger has explained expectations
of privacy in a person's automobile are less than a person's home. 120 A year
later, Justice Burger noted that "open areas" are not analogous to the "curtilage"
for purposes of aerial surveillance, and that residences have heightened
expectations of privacy. 12 1 Such distinctions, some argue, "illustrate[] how
home-search cases provide additional justification for limiting protection

11 1Kyllov. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
34(2001) (emphasis omitted); see also United
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 307 (1987) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)) ("[C]urtilage is 'the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the
"sanctity of a man's house and the privacies of life."').
112
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987).
114
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998).
115 Stern, supra note 27, at 913.
1 16
See Radin, supra note 1, at 998.
117
Wardenv. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
118
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
119
See Stem, supra note 27, at 922.
12 0
See Califonia v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985).
121Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that open areas
in an industrial plant spread over a large geographic area are not akin to the "curtilage" of a
dwelling).
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Some have raised concerns that elevating the home as

subject to greater protections does not fit the empirical evidence, as "there are
123
many, many more street encounters than searches of private homes.
E. Self-Incrimination
The Court's ruling in Boyd v. United States expressly commingled the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections to unlawful searches and selfincrimination in the home, with the text and accompanying doctrine from both
amendments running "almost into each other." 124 There, the Court held that the
doctrines:
[A]pply to all invasions.., of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offense.., it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private
property ....

125

Indeed, the Court there explained that "[b]reaking into a house and opening
boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and
compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony, or of his private papers to be
used as evidence to convict him of a crime, or to forfeit his goods" is in violation
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 126 The Court there laid out the case that
the "compulsory production" of evidence against an accused is the same as
compelling a person to be a witness against himself is prosecution, which is
prohibited under the Fifth Amendment. 127
III. THE PUZZLE OF THE HOME-LESS TAKINGS CLAUSE
The Takings Clause permits takings of "private property" so long as the
government pays and the taking is for a public use. 129 But the Court's takings
doctrine is devoid, unlike its homebound counterparts, of any special interest in
or unique protection to the home. 130 Why is this? Constitutional and property
scholars would readily point to the privacy versus property dichotomy apparent
122

See Stem, supra note 27, at 922.

12 3

See id. (quoting William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure,93 MICH. L. REv. 1016, 1061-62 (1995)).
124 Boyd v.
12 5Id.
126 Id.

United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).

127

1d. (stating that "compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony" or using "his
private papers ... to convict him").
12 8

U.S. CONST.

12 9

See Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015) (stating that the

amend. V.

government may take an individual's home in line with the Fifth Amendment if it pays just
compensation).
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on its face when exploring this question. 131 In the context of property rights, the
home is fungible and can be traded on the market for value, whereas the home
protections elsewhere in the Bill of Rights cannot be traded on the market. The
alienability of the home in the property context does not extend to the
inalienability of the right to privacy. For example, a person cannot trade his or
her privacy protection to viewing and enjoying smut in his or her home to the
next-door neighbor for market value. Nor can a person sell his or her right to
bear arms in the home to the government or trader on the market. In other words,
the longstanding explanation to the puzzle presented in this Article is that most
of the home protections in the Bill of Rights emanate from a zone of privacy
rather than private property. And, of course, those are not the same. But this
dichotomy, in and of itself, does not explain the atextual aberration of not
extending special protections to the home in takings. The home-less Takings
Clause is asymmetric with the rest of the Bill of Rights, and the prevailing
explanation of privacy-based rights in the home versus property-based
protections of the home is not the end of the story.
For decades, the Court did not expressly provide for special protections to
bearing arms in the home. It was not until Heller, and a particular Justice to
write the opinion, that the Court arrived at a homebound doctrine in the Second
Amendment. 132 Likewise, a person cannot sell certain forms of smut from the
home, such as child pornography, yet the Court offers special protection to
viewing and enjoying permissible smut in the home. 133 This property-based
limitation on sale, but privacy-based exception on possession is evidence of the
Court's fast and loose play with privacy and property dimensions in the Bill of
Rights. Indeed, the Court tends to interpret amendments and revisit its precedent
in a variety of ways that satisfy its desire to find home-centric protections.
Likewise, while takings law is redistributive in nature, it does not preclude a
"special" right to the home carved out of the Bill of Rights.
This Part contends that the answer to this textual and doctrinal riddle is that
the Court's home-centric doctrines involving smut, guns, soldiers, searches, and
self-incrimination are immune to and shielded from the Court's embrace of postLochner era judicial deference to economic regulation. 133 However, the Court's
takings jurisprudence, unlike its homebound counterparts, is focused on
advancing a body of law that primarily falls in line with preserving the postLochner judicial repudiation of substantive due process review of economic

130

See Fee, supra note 27, at 788 ("In contrast to other areas of law, eminent domain
law regards
the home as no different than any other kind of property .....
13 1
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
132 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
13 3
See McUsic, supra note 23, at 647, 653; see also Fee, supra note 28, at 793
(discussing place of "home" in eminent domain law in economic terms). Both McUsic and
Fee note the deferential treatment that takings enjoys under current Court doctrine, but
neither tie the deferential standard back to post-Lochner era deference broadly and how the
other amendments are immune from such deference, instead benefitting from strict scrutiny.
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legislation. This has hindered, but not fully foreclosed, the possibility of special
protections to homes in the takings context.
The text and history of the Takings Clause does not get scholars or jurists
very far when determining whether there exists, or should exist, a special
protection to the home. James Madison inserted the text into the draft
Constitution, and it is unclear to this day what exactly he intended when writing
those few words. 135 The historical record is also minimal, showing little
evidence of what other Framers intended with the clause. 136 There was virtually
no debate about the clause at the time of ratification. 137 Some have argued that
the purpose of the Takings Clause was to minimize the possibility of military
seizures of personal and real property during wartime. 138 Indeed, much of the
Court's takings jurisprudence has been carved out of thin air with little
adherence to the original intent, especially the Court's regulatory takings and
exactions doctrine. Doctrinalism, on the other hand, offers a useful approach to
understanding the Court's aversion to the home in light of the lack of history
and text to glean from.
It would seem that even if the Fifth Amendment textually lacks the word
"home" or "house," unlike the Third and Fourth Amendments, protections to
the house could still be read into the Court's takings doctrine. Why not? This is
exactly what the Court did in its First and Second Amendment jurisprudence, as
well as its self-incrimination clause in the Fifth. Justice Scalia, specifically,
offered the latest rendition of conservative doctrinalism to carve out the "hearth
and home" protection in gun rights. 138 Likewise, he did the same in Kyllo,
raising issue with searches and seizures that threatened the home, as opposed to
other places ordinarily understood to be domains of privacy. 140 But something
is afoot beyond mere sloppy textualism and doctrinalism or, for that matter, the
prevailing privacy versus property dichotomy for why the Court's takings
jurisprudence is "home-less." The inexplicable absence of home protections in
takings can also be explained by the Court's post-Lochnerdeferential treatment
of social and economic legislation.

134 William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J.
1738, 1794 (2013) ("When [Madison] put forth his draft of what became the Fifth
Amendment, the Takings Clause was there, tacked on to the end of some criminal procedure
rights and the Due Process Clause. Madison did not specifically discuss the Takings Clause
at all. A committee later made minor changes to the Clause's wording (also without recorded
explanation). That version passed the House and Senate, and still there was almost no
recorded discussion about the Clause's purpose." (citation omitted)).
135 See, e.g., Sprankling, supra note 27, at 131 (positing that "Framers intended the
lesser-known Takings Clause would provide greater protection to the home than to other
types of property").
136Id. at 132.
137Id. at 115 16.
13 8
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
13 9
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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A. Takings inthe Lochner Era
Indeed, revisiting Lochner begins to piece together this previously
incomplete constitutional puzzle, as it identifies the Court's deference to "class
legislation" as the crux of the home-centric schism in the Takings Clause and
the rest of the Bill of Rights. The infamous Lochner Court derived the doctrine
of "substantive economic due process" from the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 140 The Court was unabashedly hostile to "class legislation" that
advanced social policies and sought to limit government power to regulate
141
economic relationships through a conservative yet judicially active approach.
The Court carved out its doctrine targeting economic legislation, which pursued
social change, by narrowing its inquiry to whether the government action in
dispute was within the police power of the state. 142 The economic legislation
and regulations attacked by the Court, including some federal courts, included
regulatory pricing, restriction on businesses, graduated taxes, and labor
legislation. 143 One of the primary explanations for the Court's lurch towards
anti-class legislation was that the Court despised unequal legislation. 144 By
doing so, the Court found a way to review the substantive nature of government
economic regulation and legislation by asking whether the government
exercised its police powers. As a result, the Court severely limited the scope of
the state police powers.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was the origin
of the Court's Lochner-era treatment of private property rights. The Industrial
Revolution brought significant social and economic transformations in
American society. Such change also gave rise to social problems, such as
poverty and inequality. Congress and state legislatures stepped in to mitigate
these harms. However, the Court would hand down rulings that struck such
legislation as an interference with property and liberty. There, the Court found
145
redress and protections against deprivation of property without due process.
For the Court, the Constitution protected property from government
interference. 146 To rein in government overreach in the realm of private property
rights, the Court gave special meaning and interpretation to due process, takings,
and property. 147 The late 1800s Court cases were testing grounds for the
14 0 Loclmer

v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("The general right to make a contract
in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th
Amendment
of the Federal Constitution").
14 1
See id. at 64 (showing hostility to a statute that sought to limit hours worked as it
unduly restricted the "freedom of master and employee to contract with each other").
1421d. at 57.
143 See McUsic,

supra note 23, at 609.
144See generally Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of
Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,
1863 97, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975).
145 See McUsic, supra note 23, at 610.
146
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61; see McUsic, supra note 23, at 611.
147
See McUsic, supra note 23, at 612.
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Lochner Court to scrutinize legislation that affected property rights. For
example, the Court departed from its longstanding interpretation of eminent
domain and public use as dealing strictly with physical seizures of title when it
gave credence to takings that rendered property unusable. 148 In Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co., the Court found flooding of private property as a result of
government action to constitute a taking of private property. 149 The Court then
150
turned to economic legislation that affected private property rights.
In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago and Fallbrook
Irrigation District v. Bradley, the Court accelerated the theory that it could
determine whether a deprivation of property could be considered a taking of
property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, all in an attempt to forge a
bloc of doctrine to preclude class legislation in the areas of private property
rights. 151 Then, the Court'sjurisprudence morphed into a combination of criteria
to determine if the state deprived a property owner of due process protected
rights and whether the action was a taking of private property. 152 This allowed
the Court to shift its focus on core property interests such as title, possession,
and exclusion to property interests such as economic value. 153 In other words,
154
"the notion of property" became an abstract category of economic interests.
In Chicago,Milwaukee, & St. PaulRailway Co. v. Minnesota, the Court equated
"expected earning power" with traditional definitions of property. 155 Or, for
example, the Court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. stated that taxes
were the equivalent of property, and that legislation prohibiting direct taxation
on real property or income was unconstitutional. 156 The concept of property
became malleable beyond the core possession and title definitions, which gave
the Court flexibility to attack regulations on property rights, particularly those
157
that were redistributive in nature.
14 8
See id. at 612 13.
14 9
Pumpelly v. Green
150

Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 179 (1872).
See McUsic, supra note 23, at 611 (highlighting the Lochner Court's use of doctrinal
tools15to1 invalidate legislation based on their "personal belief in laissez-faire economics").
See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 134 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897)
(discussing case precedent on issue of government takings of private property for public
use);152
see also Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 113 (1896).
See McUsic, supra note 23, at 614.
15 3
See id. at 614. n.35.
154
See id.
155 Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 456 (1890) ("Under
pretense of regulating fares and freights, the State cannot require a railroad corporation to
carry persons or property without reward; neither can it do that which in law amounts to a
taking of private property for public use without just compensation .. "); see also McUsic,
supra note 23, at 614 17 (discussing the Court's evolution to understand property as
"economic value itself').
156
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601, 601 (1895); see also McUsic,
supra
note
23, at 615.
157
McUsic, supra note 23, at 614 17 (discussing case precedent on the Court's
treatment of expanding conceptions of property rights).
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As Molly McUsic explained, economic rights became property in the eyes
of the Court, and therefore, during the Lochner era, legislation and regulation
158
that affected property could be subject to substantive due process inquiries.
Rate regulation, specifically, was subject to due process inquiries under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 160 In Munn v. Illinois, for example, the Court found
that such rate regulations on railroads were the equivalent of the state forcing an
owner to run a "business with less return than he would receive without the
regulation," 160 thus viewing such economic regulations as amounting to takings
of property for public use without just compensation. 161 In other words, where
the regulation significantly reduced rates, the Court would find a taking for
public use without just compensation because the state "cannot require a railroad
corporation to carry persons or property without reward; neither can it do that
which in law amounts to a taking."162
The consistent rulings on economic regulations as equivalent to seizing
private property gained considerable support in subsequent cases in the early
1900s. 163 In Washington ex rel. Oregon Railroad& Navigation Co. v. Fairchild,
the Court found that requiring a railroad company to make a track connection
was "not a mere administrative regulation," but was a taking of property since
the company had to "expend money" and was prohibited from certain "uses" of
the land. 164 By the 1920s, the Court had concluded that regulations "could take
property by limiting its use or value, and such a taking would contravene" due
process. 165 For example, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes
explained that legislation affecting the coal mining rights of companies was not
a valid exercise of the police power, but was instead a taking. 167 Because coal
mining is valuable and a regulation making it "commercially impracticable to
mine certain coal" is the same as destroying it, the regulation is thus an
unconstitutional taking. 167 In Block v. Hirsh, the Court upheld a rent control
statute. 169 However, in doing so, the Court reiterated its Lochner-esque doctrine
that the police power may be scrutinized if it goes too far as to become nothing
15 8

Id. at 615 16.
1Id. at 616.
160
Id. at 616, 616 n.49.
161 See, e.g., Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 684 (1899); Smyth
v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 466 (1898), aff'd, 171 U.S. 361 (1898);; Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul
Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 418 (1890); Mmmv. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142 (1876).
But see Mo. Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 474, 476 (1913); Reaganv. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 154
U.S. 362, 362 (1894).
162 Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co. (The RailroadCommission Cases), 116 U.S. 307,
331 16
(1886).
3
McUsic, supra note 23, at 617.
164
Washington ex rel. Or. R.R. & Navigation Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 523 (1912);
see also Curtinv. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911).
16 5
McUsic, supra note 23, at 617.
166
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
16
15 9

7

16 8

1d.

Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 136 (1921).
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more than a regulation equivalent to a taking. 170 Thus, regulations on rents
"might amount to a taking without due process of law." 170
Indeed, the Court "routinely" found economic regulations and legislation
where property was affected to equate to takings because it limited its use or
economic value. 17 1 The market value became as constitutionally protected as
traditional sources of "property." 172 Thus, any reduction in market value, the
Court supposed, was a deprivation of property by taking. 173 This tied
"economic" legislation, and arguably "social" legislation, to the Court's
doctrinal rubrics under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and
increasingly the Takings Clause. The result was that the Court's jurisprudence
viewed any and all substantive property-based economic measures as "subject
to judicial supervision, and all could have been invalidated under the Court's
doctrine." 174 The Lochner Court's expansive view of property meant that "[i]f
economic value is property, then any change in the common-law rules could be
an unconstitutional infringement on property. "175
Amidst the Lochner era's revolt against legislation affecting liberty and
property, the Court never once raised the prospect that legislation that affected
specific property interests, such as homes, deserved greater scrutiny. Instead, a
diverse range of property, from land to market value, was given broad
protections under the Court's substantive due process inquiries from
regulations. 177 The dawn of the Court's regulatory takings doctrine saw an
opportunity to limit takings that infringed too significantly on classes of
homeowners. Yet, in Pennsylvania Coal Co., the Court failed to lift the "home"
to the pantheon heights it receives in its sister amendments.
There, Mr. and Mrs. Mahon sued to prevent a coal company from mining
under their house, which would remove the supports and cause subsidence of
the surface. 177 At the time, an anti-subsidence statute prohibited mining under
residential dwellings to prevent destruction of residences for the public good. 179
However, the house in dispute had a deed that reserved an estate interest in the
subsurface for the coal company, giving it the right to mine under the surface. 180
The Court struck down the statute as going too far by diminishing the coal

at 146.
17°Id. at 156.
169/.
17 1

McUsic, supra note 23,

172 I.

at 618.

179/.

at 394 95.

at 617.

17 3Id.
174
Id. at 624. The Lochner Court employed a two-part inquiry. Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 57 58 (1905). First was whether the regulation properly furthered the health,
safety, and welfare of the citizenry. Id. at 57. Second was whether the regulation or
legislation actually fixed the harm caused by the plaintiff. Id.
175 McUsic, supra note 23, at 624.
176Id. at 608.
177
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 394 (1922).
17 8
Id. at 393 94 n.1.
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company's property rights in the estate. 1 1 As noted, the ruling was once part of
the Court's long line of takings cases that scrutinized economic legislation.
The Court paid little attention to or special care for the "single private
house" in dispute, instead carving out a new takings doctrine that, as applied to
the case at hand, arguably under-protected the house.18 1 Justice Holmes's lack
of conviction for the "single private house" is instructive. He minimizes the
seriousness of the house by noting that "[t]his is the case of a single private
house." 18 2 There is '[n]o doubt there is a public interest even in this," but
"[s]ome existing rights may be modified even in such a case.1 18 3 Notably, the
Court stated that where exercises of police power are in dispute, the "greatest
weight is given to the judgment of the legislature.1 18 4 Ultimately, the Court
departed from its longstanding separation of takings and exercises of police
power by introducing the concept that if regulations "go too far," they will be
185
deemed "regulatory takings" in violation of the Takings Clause.
Notwithstanding the Court's lack of interest in homebound protections, the
Court's heavy-handed approach to constraining state exercises of police power
that impinged on liberty and property slowly receded. In the post-Lochner era,
largely as a result of the Court's command in Carolene Products, the Court
instead embraced deference to economic legislation affecting property interests
in takings that starkly contrasted with the Lochner Court. But at the same time,
the Court embarked on a crusade of strict scrutiny in cases where fundamental
rights were central to a dispute, thus giving the Court a useful tool to address
special protections to homes in non-economic legislation cases in which
fundamental rights converged with longstanding principles of sanctity of the
home.
B. Deference Post-Lochner
The period after 1937 is when the Court, thanks to its ruling in Carolene
Products, abandoned its economic substantive due process doctrine for a more
relaxed, deferential standard to government economic activity.18 6 Justice
Stone's famed footnote four set forth distinctions that would inevitably remove
property rights protections from substantive due process review, but leave
fundamental rights in the domain of strict scrutiny.18 7 The Court carved out an
exception to its departure from close scrutiny of economic and social legislation
180
18 1

Id. at 395.

Id. at 413.
182 Id
18 3
Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413.
184 Id.
18 5
Id. at 393.
186
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (holding that
legislative judgments for regulatory purposes are presumed legitimate absent a showing
otherwise).
187
Id. at 152 n.4.
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by remaining tethered to the doctrine where fundamental rights were at stake,
including freedom of religion, right to privacy, right to self-defense, and
freedom of press, speech, and association. 188
The new test, it was determined, was one that set forth whether "in the light
of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators." 189 In other words, strict scrutiny
would be applied to alleged violations of fundamental rights, but rational basis
review, and subsequently deference, would be applied to economic regulations.
At the same time, economic and property rights would no longer enjoy the same
Lochner-era searching judicial inquiry of government regulation. 191 Justice
Stone explained that rational basis review-the oft-recited standard as to
whether a regulation bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate
governmental interest-would be applied to regulations and statutes that
entailed life, liberty, and property, but that fundamental rights still enjoyed
substantive due process review. 19 1 Scholars have questioned the Court's
Carolene Products elevation of fundamental rights as worthy of strict scrutiny,
yet relegation of economic and property rights as merely rational basis. 192
Unlike the first four Amendments, the Takings Clause is limited in
protecting private property by the Due Process Clause's requirement of rational
basis review of legislative action in economic and social kind. 193 Unenumerated
rights, such as privacy or the right to marry, have gone from focusing on
property rights to focusing on privacy thanks to landmark cases such as
Griswold and Katz. 194 Indeed, before Katz, the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence focused on property concepts, like trespass. 195 But Katz moved
the Court in the direction of privacy protections, especially regarding the
home.

196

As a result, the Court's takings jurisprudence has almost exclusively
allowed for deferential treatment to takings because such takings usually
advance an economic-oriented agenda. As the Court long ago explained in
Carolene Products, "regulatory legislation affecting ordinary" economic
activity deserves a presumption of rational basis. 197 Such adherence to
deference seeped into the Court's takings jurisprudence even though the core of
188M.
189M. at 152.
190 Id.

191Id.
192
See, e.g., Norman Karlin, Substantive Due Process: A Doctrine for Regulatory
Control, 13 Sw. U. L. REV. 479, 479 80 (1983).
19 3
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005) (highlighting that

regulation of private property turns on whether it is "effective in achieving some legitimate
public purpose").
194 Amar, America's Lived Constitution, supra note 26, at 177 1.
19

5d
t
196 Id.
197 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 (193 8).
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the Takings Clause is to protect property owners from excessive government
regulation.1 98
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, Justice Brennan
stated that the Court would adhere to deferential standards and continue to treat
government land use regulations as nothing more than exercises of police
powers that deserve the greatest weight of deference, even though the majority
carved out an ad hoc balancing test that could conceivably be wielded to
constitutionally rein in local legislation and regulation. 199 In Berman v. Parker,
Justice Douglas surrendered the Court's substantive due process appetite,
instead choosing the Court's longstanding preference to defer to "social
legislation" for the public good. 20 1 Instead, the Court reiterated that the
legislature, not the judiciary, may exercise its powers over its affairs,
20 1
commingling the legislature's broad police powers with "public purpose."
Specifically, Justice Douglas noted "when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive," and "the legislature,
not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social
legislation.1 20 2 Indeed, for matters involving the physical seizure of private
property, the role of the Court, Justice Douglas explained, is "extremely
narrow."

203

This is not to say that the Court immediately abandoned some of the
doctrinal tools left by the Lochner Court; it simply did not hand down rulings
that were averse to economic regulation of property, notwithstanding having the
doctrinal tests at its disposal to do so. For example, the Court's balancing ad hoc
test in Penn Central could, if the Court decided, be used to strike down a
regulation that interfered with investment-backed expectations, or in other
words, regulations that impacted economic interests in the name of class
legislation. 20 4 The Court's per se takings tests formulated in Lucas v. South
CarolinaCoastal Council and Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattanCATV Corp.,
likewise, give the Court some teeth to chew away at regulations it finds overly
burdensome or redistributive in nature while nonetheless essentially giving
governments free rein to regulate property so long as it does not deprive all
economically viable use or permanently invade private property. 20 6 As scholars
have noted, this essentially means that the Court defers to and validates the
government regulations, even if it leaves less than ninety-five percent of the
property available for use. 20 7 In other words, while the Court has crafted tests
that, if it chose, could strike down or scale back regulations of property that seek
19 8

See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
199
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
2 00
Bermanv. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
201 Id.

202 Id.

203 Id.
204 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.

205 Seeinfa Part II.C.
206 Id.
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to redistribute based on price or market value, it rarely hands down rulings that
actually go that far.
Some argue that the Court's means-end exactions doctrine under the
Takings Clause is a return to Lochner-style decision-making. 20 7 Glenn Lunney,
for example, explains that the Court's exactions doctrine "is either to ignore
[precedent] or to use name-calling-Lochnerism! ,,20 8 But, as noted above, even

if today's Court still has at its disposal the doctrinal tools used by the Lochner
Court to wield against contemporary "liberal economic policy," the Court
simply has refused to go that far. 20 9 Recall the Court's exactions doctrine for
example.
There, in both Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City
of Tigard, the majority carved out a heightened standard of review to
government actions, usually planning commissions, to withhold a building
2 11
permit on condition that the landowner concede to the government's demand.
This is a means-end test that looks at the reasons for the condition and the goal
that the government is seeking to achieve. Thus, as a result, the government,
under its exactions doctrine, has the burden to show there is an essential nexus
and rough proportionality between the public harm caused by the landowner's
development and the condition to mitigate that harm. The Court, shortly after its
Nollan decision, explained that regulating property is unconstitutional unless
"there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the property use restricted by
' 2 11
the regulation and the social evil that the regulation seeks to remedy."
In the dissents in both Nollan and Dolan, Justice Brennan and Justice
Stevens raised concerns that the direction of the Court's exactions doctrine
inappropriately brought Lochner into contemporary takings doctrine. For
example, in Dolan, Justice Stevens leveled a Lochner charge against the
majority, arguing that the Court had reasserted the reasoning of Lochner by
advancing a means-end test requiring heightened scrutiny of environmental and
land use determinations by local governments in a similar vein as the Lochner
Court did in refusing to presume a connection between the hours regulation on
working in bakeries and the state interest in protecting the public health and
safety. 2 12 Justice Brennan, likewise, in Nollan argued that the Court had
207

See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A CriticalReexamination of Takings Jurisprudence, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1892, 1896 (1992); McUsic, supra note 23, at 606 n.4; Richard G. Wilkins,
The Takings Clause:A Modern Plotfor an Old ConstitutionalTale, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1, 3 (1989); J. Freitag, Note, Takings 1992: Scalia'sJurisprudenceand a Fifth Amendment
Doctrine to Avoid Lochner Redivivus, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 743, 750 (1994); Note, The
ConstitutionalityofRent ControlRestrictionson PropertyOwners 'Dominion Interests, 100
HARV.
L. REV. 1067, 1071 (1987).
20 8
Luimey, supra note 207, at 1896.
20 9
See McUsic, supra note 23, at 624.
2 10
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S.2 825
(1987).
11
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988); see also McUsic, supra note 23,
at 639.
2 12
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 406 09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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implemented a Lochner standard that was "discredited for the better part of [a]
century." 213 Of course, the majority opinion in those cases pushed back, arguing
that the Court had not resuscitated Lochner.2 14 Other scholars such as Richard
Levy, on the other hand, argue that the Lochner-era Court strategy would be a
welcome addition to today's takings doctrine, as the "problems plaguing the
Court in this area can and should be resolved by emerging from Lochner's
shadow and integrating economic interests into a broader jurisprudence of
2 15
constitutional rights."
However, the Court's exactions doctrine does not quite embrace Lochner
like some have feared. 216 The difference is that the Court during the Lochner
era protected not only core property rights, such as rights of possession,
acquisition, exclusion, and disposition, but also economic and market values of
property. 2 17 Today's Court, on the other hand, protects primarily core property
rights, such as the right to exclude, acquire, dispose, or develop land, rather than
protecting from regulations on prices, profits, or market value. 2 18 The Court, it
seems, "leaves far more of the nation's property constitutionally unprotected
from legislation than the Lochner Court did."12 19 While the methodology the

Court employs is reminiscent of Lochner-that is, a means-end heightened
scrutiny-today's Court rulings do not extend to protecting income generated
from property or striking down regulations that redistribute on that basis like the
Lochner Court did. 220 Moreover, with regards to Penn Central, as Barton

Thompson explains, "[1]acking an underlying rationale for invoking the takings
protections and haunted by the specter of Lochner, however, this tripartite
approach has provided virtually no significant restrictions on property
regulations."

22 1

One might say that the main difference is not the type of legislation between
today's Court and yesterday's Lochner Court, but the "proportion" of
redistributive legislation and regulations at risk. 222 Thus, attacks on economic

legislation affecting property by the Court today have not been on major
economic legislation by the federal or state governments, but primarily focused
on environmental and local land use regulations protecting core property
interests that give rise to the Court's means-end tests dating from Nollan and
Dolan, and most recently from Koontz v. St. John's River Management
No/Ian, 483 U.S. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 n.5; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3.
215 Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward a CoherentJurisprudenceof
Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REv. 329, 331 32 (1995); see McUsic, supra note 23, at 606
213

2 14

n.8.

2 16

McUsic, supra note 23, at 608.

217 Id.

218id.
219Id.
220 Id.

22 1

Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Allure of Consequential Fit, 51
1269 (2000).
222

McUsic, supra note 23, at 609.

ALA.

L. REV. 1261,
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District.22 3 It has consistently approved

economic regulations affecting
property, even though the Court, as noted above, still has Lochner-esque
doctrinal tools in its toolbox to strike down such legislation. 224 Even post-Nollan
and Dolan, the Court has consistently veered down the road of deference
whenever it can, and clarified some of the heightened standard of review
language employed in Nollan and Dolan that some argue is a return to
substantive due process.
In Lingle v. Chevron US.A. Inc., for example, Justice O'Connor closed the
door on the substantive due process inquiries bleeding into takings doctrine,
finding it inappropriate for the Court to employ a formula that asks whether a
regulation of private property "substantially advances" legitimate state
interests. 225 There, the majority declined to commingle substantive due process
inquiries of regulations where the crux of the dispute was whether the regulation
was a taking. 22 6 Justice O'Connor was compelled to eviscerate due process from
takings as a way to clean up some messy and "regrettably imprecise" dicta left
over from Penn Central, where the Court left the door open to the possibility
that a use restriction on real property could potentially constitute a taking if the
227
regulation was not reasonably enacted to pursue a public purpose.
Then, Justice O'Connor reverted to the Court's preferred deferential
approach, explaining that prior to engaging in inquiries of the underlying
validity of a regulation, the Court "presupposes that the government has acted
in pursuit of a valid public purpose." 22 8 The concern for the majority in Lingle
was that, if it permitted "substantially advances" inquiries into takings doctrine,
then the efficacy of "virtually any regulation of private property," including
state and federal regulations, could conceivably be scrutinized, thus
empowering courts to substitute their "predictive judgments for those of elected
legislatures." 229 Indeed, the Court's prior rule, that regulations must
substantially advance a legitimate state interest to survive a takings challenge,
was rejected in place of its longstanding preference for deference to
legislatures. 230 The same year Lingle was handed down, the Court confirmed its
willingness to continue its longstanding deference to social and economic
2 32
legislation in Kelo.
There, Justice Stevens deferred to a local government's "economic
development" policy, explaining, "[w]ithout exception, our cases have defined
[public purpose] broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to
22 3
Id.;
224

Koontz v. St. Johns River Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013).
See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 625 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
225 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005).
226
See id.
227
d. at 542; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127
(1978).
22 8
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
229/d. at 544.
23°Id. at 548.
23 1
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469 70 (2005).

THE PUZZLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HOME

2019]

1129

legislative judgments in this field." 23 2 Justice Stevens invoked a "strong theme
of federalism" in his opinion, noting that such a history is part of the Court's
longstanding "great respect"" owed to state legislatures in discerning local
public needs in eminent domain determinations. 233 He reiterated that while it
was not the Court's responsibility to question the legislature's judgment,
"nothing" in the opinion "precludes [state legislatures] from placing further
restrictions" on takings where the government seeks to redistribute private
234
property in order to achieve economic development for the broader public.
As a result, this deferential treatment in takings doctrine post-Lochner has
caused the Court to overlook and refuse to apply a heightened standard that
gives greater protections to homes and homeowners than other forms of
property. The Court's refusal to permit special protections to homes is all the
more curious in light of the many home-centric takings disputes it has reviewed
post-Lochner and the Court's simultaneous embrace of homebound doctrines
under the other Bill of Rights doctrines post-Lochner.
C. The Home-Less Takings Doctrine
As a baseline, without plaintiffs who embody the principle of the sanctity
of the home, the Court has had no reason to extend its takings doctrine to
specially protect homes or homeowners. The plaintiff in Penn Centralwas the
Penn Central Transportation Company, which owned Grand Central
Terminal. 2 36 Anthony Palazzolo, landowner of beachfront property, was denied
a permit to develop wetlands into a private beach club. 236 David Lucas was the
owner of two vacant oceanfront lots. 237 Chevron was the plaintiff in Lingle. 238
The plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
PlanningAgency were hundreds of owners of undeveloped land. 239 Ms. Dolan
was the owner of a store who sought to expand the premise and pave a parking
lot.240 Coy Koontz's 14.9-acre swath of undeveloped land was slated for
development. 241 Berman concerned the physical seizure of a department
232Id. at 480.
233Id. at 482.
234Id. at 489.
23

5Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978).

236
237

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613 15 (2001).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992). Notably, however, David
Lucas sought to build a single-family home on the beachfront property. Id.at 1007. While
the Court deemed the restriction a taking, it did not give special credence to the fact that
regulation prevented all economically viable use of his ability to build a home, but instead
that Lucas and his property interest in his land regardless of what it would be used for
later had been severely restricted. See id. at 1030 32.
23 8
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
239Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
24 0
Dolanv. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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Koontzv. St. Johns River Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 599 (2013).
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store. 242 Notwithstanding the Court's aversion to imposing home-centric
protections in cases lacking homeowner-plaintiffs, the Court has missed many
opportunities to bring the Takings Clause into uniformity with the First, Second,
Third, and Fourth Amendments in cases that dealt with a homeowner or a
243
property interest in either building, selling a home, or the seizing of a home.
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court was faced
with a relatively sympathetic landowner in Jean Loretto, owner of a multifamily
residential apartment building in Manhattan. 24 5 There, the Court missed an
opportunity to set forth distinctions in physical invasions of property interests
akin to homes where people live, where elements of personhood thrive, and
where privacy is sacred. Of course, the invader was not a law enforcement
officer or a soldier, but a physical cable imposed by a cable company, permitted
to do so by statute. 246 The Court had ample opportunity to give special scrutiny
to regulations that physically invade or occupy home-like structures. The cable
company, in fact, argued that it was permitted to physically occupy the
residence, i.e. install cable boxes, because the property relationship at issue was
residential rental buildings, and that tenants were granted a property right for
cables to be placed on the rooftops. 246 Indeed, for the majority, such distinctions
were irrelevant. They questioned "why a physical occupation of one type of
property but not another type is any less a physical occupation." 247 The physical
occupation of "plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws" that occupied "space
immediately above and upon the roof' 24 9 of apartments did not arouse the
Court's sympathy towards personhood and houses in a way to announce that
249
such physical occupations were, for example, "the chief evil against" takings.
One could imagine the Court uttering the sanctity of the home in a revisionist
version of the Loretto opinion. It did not happen. Two years later, the Court had
yet another chance to set forth a home-centric doctrine. It failed.
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Court was faced with takings
that were for the purpose of breaking up a land oligopoly where the transfer
resulted in rental homes being taken from landlords. 25° There, the Court
deferred to social legislation, explaining that Hawaii was merely attempting to
"reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly traceable to
their monarchs" and that land systems aimed at "forc[ing] ...individual
242

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954).
See Radin, supra note 1, at 989.
244
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
245 I. at 419, 438 39.
246 I. at 438 39.
247 I. at 439.
24 8
Id. at 420, 438.
24 9
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chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." Id. (citation
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homeowners" to lease rather than buy was a regulation that was a "classic
exercise of a State's police powers." 2 51 Justice O'Connor, pulling longstanding
deferential language from the Court's line of precedent, explained that
"[j]udicial deference is required because, in our system of government,
legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes should be advanced
by an exercise of the taking power" to reduce the perceived social and economic
evils of land oligopoly that forces thousands of individual homeowners to lease,
rather than buy, the land underneath their homes. 252 Again, the Court missed an
opportunity to perhaps provide stricter requirements for takings that impeded
property interests related to homeowners.
In Nollan, Mr. and Mrs. Nollan had their building permit to replace their
already existing bungalow with a larger house denied by the planning
commission. 253 Justice Scalia, the architect of home-like sensibilities in Heller
and Kyllo, was not persuaded by the rosy, American dream-like profile of the
Nollan's small bungalow, which they enjoyed in the summers and even rented
out to vacationers. 255 The Nollans proposed to build a large house, but their
permit was denied as a result of their refusal to allow a public easement across
their property in exchange for the permit. 255 Justice Scalia's quirky exactions
doctrine remained neutral, neither paying attention to nor making a distinction
between a bungalow or other property in a similar dispute.257 If anything, the
majority adhered to longstanding notions of the proverbial bundle of sticks,
257
noting that the right to exclude is one of the most essential of the sticks.
Several years later, in 1992, the Court reviewed David Lucas's challenge of
legislation that barred him from building single-family homes on two residential
lots he purchased. 2 58 He argued the restriction on building permanent habitable
structures deprived him of all economically viable use of his property. 260 It is
peculiar that the majority, especially the mostly conservative bloc of the Court,
did not utilize the home-centric nature of the dispute to give greater protections
to landowners seeking to utilize land to build and invest in homes. For one, the
South Carolina legislation not only prohibited new buildings, but also restricted
260
the "rebuilding of houses" that were previously destroyed by natural causes.
This is especially surprising given the trial court's finding that the appraisal of
the land concluded that its best and highest use would be "luxury single family
detached dwellings.1 26 1 Still, the Court found no reason to narrow the scope of
25 1

1d. at 241 42.

244.
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987).
254
1d. at 827, 841 42.
2551d. at 825.
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See id. at 831 42.
257Id. at 831.
25 8
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25 3

2591d

26°I. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261Id. at 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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its per se test to offer greater protections to landowners of lots who seek to build
single-family homes. The Court could have carved out an alternative categorical
test that prohibited legislation that rendered land slated for the development of
single-family homes a taking if the regulation deprived the landowner of, say,
more than seventy percent economically viable use of the lots, but all
economically viable use where the prospective use in dispute was commercial
or industrial.
Most recently, in Murr v. Wisconsin, the plaintiffs were landowners of two
lots, one of which had an old family-owned cabin situated on it.262 The Murr
children sought to remove the cabin to a different area in order to develop the
lot in dispute into a new residence.264 But state law prohibited the development
of the particular lot, thus giving rise to a takings claim. 265 This time, the now
retired Justice Kennedy was inattentive to the personhood narrative of the
plaintiff. He ruled in favor of the government's exercise of its powers to regulate
the lots. In doing so, he never mentioned the arguably unique nature of the
267
family cabin as perhaps overregulated.
A clue for understanding the mystery behind the Court's aversion to homecentric protections in takings can be found in Pennsylvania Coal Co. There, the
267
Court paid little attention to Mr. and Mrs. Mahon's "single private house.1
Instead of offering a special limitation on regulations that under protect the
subsurface subsidence that potentially harms the physical structure and
economic value of homes, the Court carved out a new "regulatory" takings
doctrine agnostic to any distinctions in the property interest affected. 268 The
Court was instead more interested in striking down legislation that affected the
economic value and property interests of a company. 270 But the Court did
reiterate that where exercises of police power are in dispute, the "greatest weight
is given to the judgment of the legislature." 270 That deference would be the
272
standard unless, of course, the regulation goes too far.
Likewise, take Justice Brennan's opinion in Penn Centralfor another sign.
There, the Court added a new multifactor ad hoc test to the Court's takings
jurisprudence.273 The test allows the Court to strike down regulations it finds
too offensive to the investment and economic-backed expectations of
landowners. While such doctrinal tools to attack government land use
regulations are now available as a result of Penn Central,the Court has, for the
262
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most part, declined to bludgeon most local government regulations as takings,
and has never shaped its ad hoc test to specially protect the homestead. Instead,
it adheres to deferential standards that treat such regulations as nothing more
273
than exercises of police powers that deserve the greatest weight of deference.
And recall Justice Douglas's deference to "social legislation" in Berman for
an additional hint. 274 There, the Court was focused on respecting urban renewal

as a justifiable public good, making no distinction as to the property taken,
whether residential homes or commercial businesses. 276 Justice Douglas
explained that "when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive" and "the legislature, not the judiciary,
276
is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation.1
Similarly, Justice Stevens deferred to a local government's "economic
development" policy in Kelo, explaining, "[w]ithout exception, [that] our cases
have defined [public purpose] broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of
deference to legislative judgments in this field. '277 There, the Court seemed
disinterested in providing homes the same level of protection from government
expropriation as the home (and its private occupants) receives from warrantless
searches or the forced quartering of soldiers in peacetime. Kelo, arguably the
Court's most contentious home-centric dispute, was a missed opportunity to
bring harmony with the other homebound amendments. The case was the
quintessential American dream narrative. There, Ms. Kelo's little pink house
was threatened by eminent domain to make way for a major economic
development project that never came to fruition.2 79 Justice Stevens's opinion
never mentions the home as worthy of additional protections, and certainly does
not cite to prior rulings under cousin amendments that provided greater
protections to the home. 280 However, in his Kelo dissent, Justice Clarence
Thomas, troubled by majority's lack of concern for protecting plaintiffs' homes,
explains the oddity of protecting homes in other constitutional contexts but
28 1
refusing to do so under the Takings Clause.
There, Justice Thomas stated that the Court has long recognized "the
overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our
traditions since the origins of the Republic.1 28 1 He then juxtaposes the Fourth
Amendment's search and seizure doctrine with the Fifth Amendment's taking
doctrine, arguing that it is difficult to square how "citizens are safe from [police
searches] in their homes, [but] the homes themselves are not" protected from

27 3

274

275
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Berman v.Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
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government seizures. 2 82 The Court, he said, has "elsewhere recognized 'the
overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our
traditions since the origins of the Republic,"' but that the majority's ruling
leaves homes themselves unprotected from taking. 2 83 Perhaps most prescient is
this excerpt from Thomas's dissent: "[t]he [majority] tells us that we are not to
'second-guess the [legislative] judgments,"' but the real issue is "whether the
government may take the infinitely more intrusive step of tearing
down... homes," and as a result something has "gone seriously awry with this
Court's interpretation of the Constitution. '284 He continued: "We would not
defer to a legislature's determination of the various circumstances that
establish, for example, when a search of a home would be reasonable," because
we have recognized the "overriding ...sanctity of the home. '28 5 Thomas's
passage in his dissent hints at, but does not explicitly answer, the real dilemma
in the Court's void in home protections in takings as opposed to other
homebound doctrines in the Bill of Rights.
D. Explanations
Justice Thomas's dissent is perhaps a useful segue into discussing the lack
of deference afforded to governmental action against fundamental rights.
Indeed, as he noted, the Court does not ordinarily defer to the government's
287
determination when it decides to search and seize a home without a warrant.
The Constitution fundamentally protects such searches under the Fourth
Amendment. As for fundamental rights, the Court is skeptical of deferential
treatment to government determinations. Indeed, the Court does not, as Justice
Thomas explained, defer to the law enforcement officials' judgments regarding
2 88
when and if to enter a home or search and seize property without a warrant.
It is telling that after the Court's Carolene Products ruling effectively
ousted Lochner-erajudicial scrutiny to economic legislation from the Court's
Bill of Rights jurisprudence, the Court consistently and systematically carved
out homebound protections in the entire first half of the Bill of Rights, while at
the same time choosing deference over home-centric doctrines in its takings
jurisprudence. Indeed, while the Court made short shrift of governments that
seized homes for economic development or governments that denied building
permits for single family home developments, it regularly found physical entries
into the home to be a chief evil or the right to bear arms in the hearth and home
as more worthy of protection above all other interests.
The District of Columbia ordinance in Heller restricting gun possession in
the home, even if for the health, safety, and general welfare of the public, did
282 Id.
28 3
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
284 Id.
28 5
Id. (emphasis added).
286
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not receive the kind of deferential treatment an ordinance regulating land use
would receive. The right to bear arms, the Court emphasized, is a fundamental
289
right of the individual, not the collective.
The statute at issue in Stanley prohibiting lewd material in the home was
purportedly enacted to regulate possession of material "thought to be
detrimental to the welfare" of the citizens. 289 But that argument is weakened
when viewed in light of the constitutional limitations on regulations or
governmental action that intrudes into one's privacy. The Court long ago upheld
restrictions on the commercial sale of certain obscene material as defensible in
limited contexts for the public welfare. Thus, privacy and speech rights in
Stanley were violated when viewed as fundamental rights issues by the Court
requiring closer scrutiny. 29 1 This closer scrutiny permitted the Court to glean at
the place and space of the violations, and to determine that where such
legislative offenses occur, the Court will offer additional protections to ensure
fundamental rights are not violated.
Likewise, the statute in Payton permitting warrantless arrests and invasions
in the privacy of the home when emergency or dangerous circumstances are
afoot was not the kind of economic legislation that the Court would ordinarily
find for deference. 29 1 Instead, the Court employed protections to fundamental
2 93
rights, as opposed to deference to allowing warrantless arrests to occur.
Once placed in this historical context against the backdrop of the postLochner era, the fundamental puzzle-why the Court offers homebound
protections in its obscenity, gun rights, quartering soldiers, search and seizure,
and self-incrimination doctrines, but neglects an equivalent doctrine under the
Takings Clause-becomes clearer. But how can the Court move its takings
jurisprudence in line with the rest of its homebound sister amendments? Rather,
is homebound concordance and uniformity across the Bill of Rights, where
applicable, necessary, or desirable?
IV. TOWARDS A THEORY OF COHERENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HOME
There are several broader theoretical implications, if not questions, that
remain. If textualists are adamant about consistent readings of text, then one
might suspect that the Court should only recognize special protections in the
home where the text commands in the Third and Fourth Amendments. Such a
result would preclude special protections in or to the home involving smut, guns,
self-incrimination, and takings. Likewise, one might argue that the home-less
Takings Clause is not defective, but rather that the Court's other various atextual
home-centric doctrines are wrong. The concern here is that the "purposivist
[and] precedent-based interpretive" methods have gone far beyond the text and
288
28 9
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29°1d. at 565.
29 1

See Paytonv. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980).

292

T-7

1136

OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 80:6

history to resuscitate and maintain the principle of the sanctity of the home in
American constitutional law. 2 93 Therefore, it might be said, just leave the home-

less takings doctrine in place. Yet, it is difficult to escape the predominantly
"atextual nature of the Court's opinions" involving the home in the other
amendments, 295 and this suggests that the Court's lack of homebound
limitations in its takings jurisprudence is evidence that it has failed to engage in
the same atextual home-centric method of interpretation as its other homecentric doctrines in the Bill of Rights. In other words, the Court has created
asymmetry where all doctrinal signs point towards a Bill of Rights of homecentric symmetry. This instance of incoherence in takings doctrine, then, is
peculiar.
Constitutional congruence of home protections offers a comprehensive
vision of the sanctity of the home in the Bill of Rights that embraces consistency
and predictability. This constitutional congruence, in other words, offers a
pragmatic mode of interpretation that harmonizes the home consistently in
between and across all five amendments, including the Takings Clause. The
addition of homebound protections in takings would further allow scholars and
jurists to contemplate the home not solely through the lens of an "individual line
295
of constitutional text" as if bound to, say, the Third or Fourth Amendment.
Rather, pursuing home protections in the Takings Clause harmonizes homecentric doctrines in the Bill of Rights as a whole. 296 This is achieved by doing
two things at once: inferring the "home's constitutional primacy from the
structure and context of the document itself,"297 and subsequently drawing
parallels to the sanctity of the home by leaning on precedent and doctrine from
other doctrines within the Bill of Rights. But what is the theoretical basis for the
claim that home-centric doctrines across the Bill of Rights should be interpreted
congruently and coherently to include special protections in the Takings Clause?
A. Coherence Theory
Our constitutional culture generally aspires to a theory of coherence.
Richard Fallon argues that even though the multiple modes of constitutional
interpretation-text, structure, history, doctrine-are distinct, they are
interconnected in ways that allow interpreters to find "constructivist
coherence"-a form of reflective equilibrium that is influenced by reciprocal
modes of assessment and reassessment. 2 98 This theory calls for scholars and
jurists to "assess and reassess the arguments in" text, history, precedent, and
29 3
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structure to "understand each of the relevant factors as prescribing the same
result.1299 Doing so, according to Fallon, results in "coherence.1 30 1 This is
because the modes of interpretation are "substantially interrelated and
interdependent" and that this reciprocal influence helps achieve constructivist
coherence "most of the time.° 30 1 Constitutional interpretation "prescribe [s]" to
embody various interpretations that lead to the "same result. 30 2 Fallon explains:
[I]f the conclusions fail to cohere into a uniform prescription for how the case
or issue ought to resolved, then any or all of the individual conclusions may be
reexamined, and the results adjusted insofar as plausible within the prevailing
conventions of constitutional analysis, in an effort to achieve a uniform
outcome.

303

This is a familiar line of logic that has roots in John Rawls's teaching of
''reflective equilibrium" that advocates for an intellectual process of adjusting
and correcting concepts to achieve a coherent theory. 30 4 Likewise, in the
constitutional interpretive context, "our constitutional practice" arguably
implicitly prescribes the attainment of coherence. 30 5 To achieve this coherence
and ultimately, for example, home-centric congruence in the Bill of Rights,
interpreters rely upon "patterns of influence and adjustment" to make coherence
attainable.306 Indeed, under this theory, the claim for constitutional congruence
of home-centric doctrines across the Bill of Rights is substantially supported by
the fact that interpreters must utilize, among other methods, textualism and
doctrinalism to fully appreciate the desire for a coherent homebound Bill of
Rights.
In each separate amendment in the first half of the Bill of Rights, the Court
has utilized a variety of interpretive tools to find a zone of protections in or to
the home. While smut is given an atextual and largely doctrinal protective
treatment inside the home, derived largely from the textual home-centric
protections of the Fourth Amendment, both interpretive tools were used to
achieve symmetry in home protections. 30 8 Likewise, the Second Amendment's
atextual and historical treatment by Justice Scalia in Heller relied upon the
atextual First Amendment and the textual Fourth Amendment to find consistent
application of a homebound protection to the right to bear arms the "hearth and

2991d. at
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home." 30 9 The interconnectedness that Fallon speaks to plays out in the Court's
prominent Kelo decision, as mentioned in Part 111.3 10
The Kelo ruling was arguably a commensurability problem. That problem
raises the question of what category of interpretation should be used when
invoking a particular interpretive tool results in different outcomes. Inevitably,
Fallon concludes that "blurring occurs in some cases between" some of the
categories of constitutional interpretation. 310 Rereading Thomas's dissent with
an eye towards coherence theory seems to suggest that Justice Thomas was
seeking to extend the home-centric doctrinal thread from searches to takingstwo amendments adjoined at the hip, but distinct in approaches to home
protections.
There, Justice Thomas was concerned with the specter of incoherence,
noting that the Court has "elsewhere [in the Fourth Amendment] recognized 'the
overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our
traditions since the origins of the Republic.' 3 11 Indeed, textually he finds the
"house" substantially protected in the Fourth Amendment, but unprotected in
the Takings Clause. 3 13 He wants it both ways. His concern was that since the
Court specially protects persons from warrantless searches and seizures in the
home, why should the government be capable of tearing down homes without
special limitations? By not reading the Fourth Amendment protections of the
home congruently with the Fifth Amendments protections to private property,
Justice Thomas concluded that the Court's interpretation of the Constitution had
,gone seriously awry." 3 13 Here, textualism and doctrinalism seem to converge
and be interrelated (or blurred) in those few lines of Justice Thomas's dissent.
This "reciprocal influence" between interpretive methods seemed to color
Justice Thomas's implicit plea for coherence. In other words, it would seem that
bringing closure to the homebound schism in the Bill of Rights, as this Article
calls for, is simply part of the evolution of coherence theory.
Likewise, in the late 1800s, the Court in Boyd expressly commingled the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections to unlawful searches and selfincrimination in the home, with the text and accompanying doctrine from both
amendments running "almost into each other. "314 This was arguably yet another
attempt at achieving some coherence, and aligns with the Third Amendment's
mandate to prohibit quartering of soldiers during peacetime. 315 The Court's
Stanley ruling was arguably yet another attempt to thread an additional
amendment to homebound coherence, as the Court explained that "[i]f the First
308
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
30 9
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Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch. 3 16 And again in Payton,the Court sought to achieve an advanced thread
of coherence by finding that "the physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.1 3 17 Finally,
Justice Scalia leaned on the Fourth Amendment's explicit homebound
protections arising in Payton to declare, in Heller, that there existed an elevated
right to bear arms in the "hearth and home" above all other interests under the
Second Amendment. 318 Again, underlying these home-centric doctrinal moves
is an implicit attempt at coherence theory in constitutional law. Fallon's
"constructive" variation of coherence theory is useful in understanding the
process of utilizing each interpretive method to find the same result where
possible. Indeed, doing so raises, yet again, the prevailing question in this
Article. Why not apply coherence theory to the Takings Clause as a theoretical
ground to extend the home-centric doctrinal threat to takings?
B. Cons/ience
This Article's conception of the home-centric Bill of Rights begins to look
and sound like Jules Coleman's definition of consilience theory-that is, "other
things equal, it is good when a theory can bring a diversity of phenomena under
a single explanatory scheme." 319 Take Newton's theory of gravitation, and all
its conceptions of orbiting planets around the sun. Prior to Newton's theories,
these conceptions were, in the language of constitutional scholars, "individual
line[s] of constitutional text" under each Amendment in the Bill of Rights
viewed and understood separately from each other. 320 Instead, consilience
would ask interpreters to view certain aspects of the Bill of Rights, such as home
32 1
protections, "as a whole.1
Jules Coleman explains this phenomenon through the lens of tort and
criminal law. The two, he argues, are interconnected. 323 In fact, the two might
be "unified" under a theory of consilience that shows "why we need these
323
distinct bodies of law, each with its distinct and ineliminable principles.1
Likewise, the Bill of Rights, while offering constitutional rights and protections,
also espouses generally distinct bodies of constitutional law. Yet, to view these
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (emphasis added).
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (internal quotations omitted).
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bodies of law as interrelated and interconnected is to "explain how the modes
of practical reasoning and substantive principle realized in each part of the law
express fundamentally or unavoidably (perhaps even necessarily) unique
features of that part. '324 Indeed, applying substantive principles in home-centric
doctrines involving smut, guns, soldiers, searches, and self-incimination gives
scholars and jurists a sense of equilibrium that arguably justifies an extension to
takings. As Coleman explains in consilience theory:
The basic point is simply that a good explanation can show how various parts
of the whole differ from one another in some systematic or principled way, and
how their doing so contributes to the coherence of the whole. In the limiting
case, such an explanation might demonstrate that different parts of the whole
are necessarily distinct, and that the principles or concepts involved in each are
325
unique.
Indeed, the "norm of consilience tells us only that a theory that explains"
Second Amendment law "in terms of a given set of principles is better to the
extent that those principles can also explain other practices" such as Takings
Clause law. 326 Thus, "the theory contributes to a more comprehensive
327
understanding of the whole.

C. Harmony
Several questions emerge after answering why the Court's Bill of Rights
jurisprudence fails to provide equivalent protections to homes in takings and
why the Court, as a matter of coherence theory, should actively carve out a
takings doctrine that specially protects homes. The logical next step is to ask
how should the Court construct a homebound pronouncement that brings the
Court's takings jurisprudence into harmony with its counterparts. This is no easy
task, because while a "man's home may be his castle ... that does not keep the
Government from taking it" under the prevailing takings doctrine .328 A "general
limitation [on taking homes] has not developed. '329 Indeed, it seems
,.anomalous" that "some explicit protection to family homes from government
taking [s]" has not developed. 330 While the Takings Clause "prohibits the taking
of any home (or other private property) without just compensation, '33 1 it does
not, in any real sense, offer special protections to homes.
As some scholars have noted, "one might expect to find an implied
limitation on the eminent domain power" that protects a "special class of
324

1d. at 42 43.
53 n.4.
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property like a family home" from a taking "unless the government shows a
'compelling state interest' and that [the] taking ... is the 'least intrusive
alternative.' ' 332 This is, in other words, an argument for strict scrutiny where
homes are at stake. In the Court's Kelo decision, Justice Kennedy along with the
three dissenting Justices, raised the prospect of the Court imposing heightened
scrutiny to takings by peering into the motives behind government takings for
334
economic development purposes.
As Justice Kennedy noted, the majority opinion does not "foreclose the
possibility that a more stringent standard of review ... might be appropriate for
a more narrowly drawn category of takings. '334 Thus, it is plausible that the
Takings Clause could be brought in line with its cousin home-centric provisions
by relying upon a more stringent standard of review or simply heightened
review where homes are threatened by condemnation. Admittedly, "[e]ven if
the Court began applying heightened scrutiny" as Justice Kennedy suggested,
"it is far from certain that homes would receive any special protection." 335 Some
scholars have questioned Kelo critics, noting that many "have not clearly
articulated a textually grounded constitutional rationale thatjustifies specifically
protecting homes from condemnation. "336
There are, nonetheless, several tweaks that could be made to the Court's
prevailing takings doctrine, including all three veins-eminent domain,
regulatory, and exactions-to carve out protections to homes under the Takings
Clause, thereby bringing congruence across the first half of the Bill of Rights.
A special limitation to taking homes may offer broad special safety to the
historical targeting of homes by local governments. 337 The root of this Article's
extension of special protections to homes in the takings context lies in what
Barton Thompson coins as the "consequential fit" in takings; that is, the Court's
scrutiny of the "relationship between the actions or status of a property owner
338
and the burden imposed on the property owner by the challenged regulation."
Indeed, Thompson is referring to the Court's exactions doctrine born from
Nollan and Dolan, which offers the Court the doctrinal teeth to "sink... into
the meaty and meaningful question of whether particular property owners, rather
339
than society more broadly, should bear the cost of public goods and services."
The concern, as discussed above, is that such doctrinal teeth invites "allusions"
to Lochner.340 Yet, this concern is overstated, since the Court does not invalidate
government exercises of police power where the effect is price controls on
332
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property. Rather, the Court has remained steadfast with its approach to actions
that impact land development or environmental regulations. Thus, one way to
conceptualize a home-centric Takings Clause in harmony with the rest of the
Bill of Rights is to find a happy-medium doctrine amidst the dizzying array of
available takings doctrines to limit regulations that affect homes or require
greater than fair market value in compensation for the taking.
1. Means-EndPublic Use Inquiry
One such alteration to takings doctrine would be for the Court, in limited
circumstances, to embrace Lochner-like searching scrutiny by applying its
exactions tests as a special doctrine solely for takings that expropriate title or
affect the economic value of core property interests, such as homes. 34 1 The
exactions heightened scrutiny test would be applied only where the economic
value of a core property interest, such as homeownership, is diminished,
destroyed, or expropriated by the governmental action. In other words, where
homes are subject to a taking, the Court's exactions heightened scrutiny tests
would "carry over to other portions of the takings clause," 342 including eminent
domain and regulatory taking to create a special homebound limitation under
the Takings Clause. This would give rise to the Court adopting and applying a
special means-end test as a homebound limitation doctrine.
Indeed, adopting a special limitation for taking homes requires the Court to
abandon, in limited circumstances, its post-Lochner deferential standard of
review and, instead, requires the government to connect the means for which it
achieves the end when taking homes. Richard Epstein and Nicole Garnett have
343
raised the prospect of exactions doctrine seeping into public use doctrine.
Such a doctrinal move would arguably threaten prior rulings, such as Midkiff or
Kelo. 344 This would fit with the narrative that the Court, as a matter of
concordance and coherence with its other homebound amendments, desert postLochner deference by abandoning rational basis and instead mandating
governments show a rational connection between the means of condemning
homes and the public use end. 346 Such a test would require a showing that the
taking of homes is "reasonably necessary" to advance the public purpose
346
proposed, such as economic development.

34 1

See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 409 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Nollanv. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 28 (1987); supra Part IV.A.
342 Richard Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
479, 491 92 (1995); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Economics ofPublic Use, 72 CORNELL L.
REv.3461,
65 (1986).
3
See Epstein, supra note 342, at 491 92; Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use
Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 934, 938 (2003).
344 Epstein, supra note 342, at 491 92.
345 Garnett, supra note 343, at 938.
346Id. at 939.
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As with most exactions inquiries, this is a difficult heightened standard for

governments to meet. It requires extensive studies and data, including factual
evidence, to show direct and rational connections between the condemnation of
homes and the ultimate public purpose. Drawing upon public use challenges by
homeowners might offer a more "narrowly focused and judicially manageable
inquiry" in takings involving houses. 347 If the Court had given the Nollan's
bungalow searching judicial protection, then perhaps the cross-pollination
argument of exaction jurisprudence into public use to provide a homebound
limitation would be strengthened. Even under the Court's regulatory takings
doctrine, it would seem that "courts would protect one's home to a far greater
extent than one's commercial plans, even if the result, in purely monetary terms,
seems irrational. 348 Some scholars have raised the broader normative point that
where property interests in dispute are "personal" or give rise to "personhood,"
there should be available a "prima facie case that [such a] right should be
protected to some extent against invasion by government.1 34 9 Indeed, the
Court's exactions doctrine is perhaps the most potent area of takings that could
give rise to special homestead protections.
For example, the Court's longstanding deferential treatment to its public use
inquiry from Berman to Kelo would require governments to connect the "means
by which it acquires land to the particular purpose" when condemning homes.350
Indeed, the Supreme Court would "put the government to its proof-requiing
a demonstrated connection between" the taking of homes and the specific
35 1
purpose used to justify the taking.
2. Penn Central AdHoc Test
Under a normative homebound takings doctrine, the Court's Penn Central
ad hoc balancing test would place the burden on the government, rather than the
challenger, to show the regulation did not affect the investment-backed
expectations of the homeowner. Indeed, had Penn Central been a homeowner,
then the "character" of the governmental action would be given searching
scrutiny by the Court. Perhaps more important would be the investment-backed
expectations of the home. Homeowners, unlike developers, do not necessarily
view their immovable structure as a strong fungible asset, because most
Americans are single-family homeowners and rarely own more than one
home. 35 3 Thus, the investment-backed expectation would arguably exceed that
347 Merrill, supra note 342, at 67.
34 8
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of the typical developer-landowner. Regulations that impede on the economic
value of the home in even the slightest of cases should be construed as enjoying
special protection from the regulation in dispute, whether invalidation or
compensation formulas that offers more than fair market value.
One could conceive of a doctrine that limits the taking of homes by requiring
greater compensation, particularly in tests such as Penn Central.353 Indeed, a
"homeowner's emotional attachment to her home merits special respect, either
in the compensation formula or in some other appropriate way." 354 Given the
Court's focus on homes elsewhere in the Bill of Rights, it makes sense, then, for
vigilance in protecting private dwellings. 355 Not giving special preference for or
protections to investors whose property is taken might make sense, but as for
those homeowners "displaced from [their] homestead[s], the matter seems
different" because houses "are not merely fungible investments," but rather they
356
entail personhood-elements that cannot be quantified.
This would require a very different calculation of just compensation when
considering seizing homes where personal history, loved ones, and people's
lives are intertwined in the fabric of the property. 357 In other words, government
would be required to engage in a "very different kind of calculus" when seeking
to condemn a home by giving a "bonus above fair market value in setting the
rate of just compensation." 358 While investors could potentially abuse this
"bonus," it is still an arguably necessary recalculation of the traditional just
compensation rate because homeowners assets are not fungible, but instead
involve elements of personhood unlikely to be considered in a typical fair
market valuation. 359 A typical homeowner values his property very differently
than the market, 360 and thus the market value does not "compensate landowners
completely. '36 1 In other words, the government simply cannot capture person's
interests in memories, community, friends, family, stability, and comfort into
fair market value, because these "elements are far more valuable than the
marketable elements of property. '362 These considerations are sharply different
than considerations of a business owner's fair market value when facing
condemnation, and these differences impact appraisals. 364 One could imagine
THERE?, https://www.huduser.gov/periodicals/ushmc/spring2004/articleUSH
MC-04Q 1.pdf [https://perma. cc/K27D-K53 V] (demonstrating few Americans own more
than35one
home).
3
See Amar, America's Lived Constitution,supra note 26, at 1777.
354
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the government being required to pay an additional "bonus" or fee when
condemning homes to mitigate any hint of unfairness or inefficiency in Penn
Centralchallenges that show some governmental interference with investment364
backed expectations.
3. Less than All Economically Viable Use
The Court's Lucas test, likewise, would be strengthened by either
invalidating a regulation altogether or requiring above-market compensation
when the regulation has reduced the market value of the home by twenty-five
percent (or some other decisional percentage), instead of the constitutional
baseline of "all economically viable use" of the home. 365 In other words, homes
would enjoy a test that would invalidate a regulation or require above market
compensation where the regulation deprived the homeowner of less than all
economically viable use of the property, while all other forms of private
property would be subject to the traditional test of all economically viable use.
The Lucas case, in and of itself, presented a missed opportunity to embark on
this kind of test, but Justice Blackmun's dissent offers a homebound roadmap.
David Lucas was seeking a permit to build single-family homes on his
undeveloped land. 367 Justice Blackmun's dissent engages with the trial court
record, noting that the appraised value of Lucas's undeveloped land was
determined "based on the fact that the 'highest and best use"' was "luxury"
single-family detached homes. 368 This suggested the value was determined only
based on its best use, and anything less than the best use rendered the
undeveloped land valueless. 369 Further, Justice Blackmun chastised the majority
for disposing of a doctrine that looks at each case and its particular
circumstances to determine whether a regulation renders the need for just
compensation to a property owner. 370 Of course, a less than all economically
viable use test may threaten such a home-centric claim because local

36 4
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governments could, conceivably, simply argue that the regulation is nothing
more than exercise of their police power untethered to a takings claim.
Notably, Justice Stevens's dissent raises the prospect that Lucas may not
have even met a "temporary takings" claim entitled to just compensation
because it is unclear when Lucas planned to build and to what extent the statute
"temporarily" frustrated his building plans. 37 1 Justice Stevens notes that under
the majority's per se rule, Lucas would lose nearly all his land value if-say
95 %-were deprived, whereas a similarly situated landowner would be entitled
to just compensation if 100% were deprived. 372 It would seem that where homes
are in dispute, the opposite would be true. The home would be elevated above
all other property interests. A regulation that diminishes 100% or less of value
of the home would require just compensation for the homeowner, whereas
commercial or industrial property would be subject to the traditional per se test
of all economically viable use.
4. Temporary PhysicalInvasion
Likewise, the Court's Loretto test would also be stricter where the
challenger is a homeowner. For example, it would be enough for the homeowner
to mount a challenge under a home-centric regulatory takings challenge when
the "character of the governmental action" is a temporary, rather than
permanent, physical occupation or invasion of the home, regardless of the public
purpose or benefit of the regulation. 372 Broadening the scope of the Loretto test
is important for purposes of conceptualizing a harmonious and congruent homecentric Bill of Rights-it offers seamless thematic and doctrinal associations
across adjoining and non-adjoining Bill of Rights doctrines that protect the
home. 37 3 Historically, the Court has only entertained permanent physical

occupations as subject to the Takings Clause. 375 However, the Court's lackluster
reasoning in Loretto (why permanent occupation rather than temporary
invasion?) left the door open for the Court to entertain challenges where the
governmental action temporarily invades or occupies the home.
5. Class of One Homeowner Protections
Recall CaroleneProducts. Footnote four suggested that discrete and insular
groups may enjoy a "more searching judicial inquiry" or "exacting judicial
scrutiny" than economic regulations and social legislation. 375 This approach
would offer strict scrutiny to fundamental rights, but leave economic and social
37°Id. at 1061 62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37 1
See
372
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legislation to rational basis review.3 77 To effectively bring the home into the
ambit of the homebound pronouncements made regarding smut, guns, soldiers,
searches, and self-incrimination, the Court would need to remove itself from the
ghost of post-Lochner era deference. One way to do this is to entertain the Equal
Protection Clause as a vehicle to allow the Court to engage in searching inquiries
of a discrete and insular group, such as homeowners. Justice Thomas, in his
Kelo dissent, likewise noted that "intrusive judicial review" was necessary to
protect "discrete and insular minorities" from takings. 377 One might argue that
this implied that minority homeowners, specifically, were threatened by a
deferential takings standard, since they are traditionally a politically
underrepresented group. Thus, governments will be incentivized to target
minority homeowners because such takings would be the path of least
resistance. Some scholars have called for eminent domain that seizes homes
from low-income people as impermissible due to inadequate representation of
minority groups in the political process. 378 This would arguably mitigate the
number of poor people forced to lose their homes "simply because they are
poor."379
The Court's ruling in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech perhaps provides a
strong doctrinal candidate for a homebound limitation in takings, or at the very
least, a cross-pollinated example of finding greater protections from within
constitutional standards. 38 1 There, the Court held that homeowners were
permitted to sue under Equal Protection as a "class of one" in the context of
zoning. 382 However, some argued that such an argument could be used in the
eminent domain context. If a group of homeowners, as opposed to other
landowners, were singled out for condemnation, then it is possible that a
homeowner could "bring suit to challenge the arbitrariness of the decision to
take the property" in violation of Equal Protection. 383 This argument is
predicated on Equal Protection and enforced by Section 1983 causes of action
that allege government agencies and officers intentionally treated homeowners
differently than other similarly situated landowners. 384 Such an argument is
385
pronounced when race is considered.
376

377

See id. at 152.

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521 22 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4); see also Josh Blackman, Equal Protection
from Eminent Domain: Protectingthe Home of Olech's Class of One, 55 LOY. L. REV. 697,
737 37388 (2009).
See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the Solution of
Representation Reinforcement, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005).
37 9
1d. at 6.
380 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). See generally
Gerald S. Dickinson, State ConstitutionalGeneral Welfare Doctrine, 40 CARDOzO L. REv.
2943 (2019).
381 Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
382 Blackman, supra note 377, at 700.
38 3
Id. at 727.
384
Id. at 730.

1148

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 80:6

For example, "if all homeowners in a group targeted for eminent domain
were black," and similarly situated landowners not threatened by condemnation
were white, then a discrete and insular minority group would essentially be
treated differently in violation of Equal Protection. 38 6 The essence of the "class
of one" theory is that it does not ask whether eminent domain is "necessary to
achieve a certain public purpose, but rather scrutinizes the decision to take the
particular plot of property.1 38 7 However, it is important to note here that such a
homebound protection exists outside the Takings Clause, since a "class of one"
theory has only been applied under Equal Protection challenges. 388 Indeed, the
Takings Clause protects property rights and does not search for or find
discrimination. The Takings Clause in and of itself, therefore, is unlikely to be
38 9
the venue for remedying discrimination against minority homeowners.
Nonetheless, given the nature of the doctrinalism used by the Court in its homecentric doctrines involving smut or soldiers, the "class of one" theory may offer
a legitimate homebound limitation in takings under Equal Protection.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article explored the fundamental puzzle of the Bill of Rights'
distinctive textual and doctrinal protections to the home. Indeed, the Court's
jurisprudence involving smut, guns, soldiers, searches, and self-incrimination
extends protections to the home, but inexplicably does not in takings. The
reason, it seems, is that the former doctrines have proven immune to postLochner era judicial deference to economic regulation, largely as a result of the
Court acknowledging those protections as fundamental, whether enumerated or
unenumerated, particularly privacy protections. Yet, the Court can bring
harmony to the homebound Bill of Rights by, among other proposals, adjusting
several of its public use and regulatory takings tests.
The importance of connecting all the homebound dots and then reorienting
all the pieces of the puzzle cannot be overstated. The Court's home-centric
doctrines are mostly atextual. Doctrinalism has pushed the Court's Justices,
whether liberal or conservative, to adhere to a purposivist or precedent-based
interpretive methodology where homes are central to a dispute, even if the home
is not textually explicit in a particular Amendment. What we find by applying
an interpretive methodology of doctrinalism to the Takings Clause is clarity,
coherence, and consistency in protections to the home. This extension of the
home-centric doctrinal thread to the Takings Clause offers scholars and jurists
a theoretical justification for homebound coherence across the Bill of Rights.
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